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ABSTRACT 
The contractual nature of arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution in the 
context of cross-border/international disputes traditionally emphasises confidentiality 
as one of the fundamental characteristics of international arbitration. Confidentiality 
is often assumed to be a common feature and advantage of international commercial 
arbitration, and the privacy of arbitral proceedings has facilitated and encouraged 
recourse to arbitration. However, the issue of conﬁdentiality has a different 
dimension and is limited in the context of international investment and trade 
disputes. The participation of States, State entities, sub-divisions and agencies in 
international disputes shifts the emphasis from privacy and conﬁdentiality to 
transparency and accountability. This study analyses the role of confidentiality in 
investor-State arbitration, noting that confidentiality is not always preserved in many 
respects and stages throughout the arbitration proceedings. The paper considers the 
issues that challenge the legal effectiveness of confidentiality in international 
investor-State arbitration and the development towards transparency. In particular, 
the paper examines the participation of non-disputing/third parties in investor-State 
arbitration, the different approaches of major arbitral institutions towards the issue of 
confidentiality, and the arguments for and against confidentiality in relation to 
transparency. It concludes by making recommendations in the context of the 
development of investor-State arbitration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is widely regarded as the most efficient dispute resolution method in cross-
border business transactions.
1
  Investor-State arbitration as a method of dispute 
resolution is part of the framework developed for a stable, neutral and enforceable legal 
regime under multilateral and bilateral treaties/agreements frequently used for the 
resolution of cross-border disputes between foreign investors and host countries.
2
 
Investor-State arbitration provides a specialised dispute resolution mechanism which 
deals with a distinctive category of investment disputes, involving the application of 
substantive international law protections to governmental actions and regulatory 
measures and implicating complex international and domestic policies.
3
  
Recourse to investor-State arbitration is basically motivated by the fact that it is 
significantly detached and autonomous from the domestic legal system of the host 
country, as well as the insistence on party autonomy in determining the rules of law that 
would govern the relationship between the disputing parties and the resolution of their 
disputes.
4
  
One of the many reasons for the growing use of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution method alternative to regular court proceedings capitalises on its being less 
public, thereby creating a general perception of confidentiality in arbitration across 
national borders, in contrast to court proceedings. It is a general presumption that one of 
the fundamental bases for the submission by parties of their disputes to commercial 
arbitration rather than litigation is to preserve the privacy and confidentiality of the 
arbitral process to the extent possible.
5
 The presumption of confidentiality of the arbitral 
process in the context of investor-State arbitration would ensure privacy of the 
                                                          
1
 Lutz-Christian Wolff The Law of Cross-Border Business Transactions: Principles, Concepts, Skills 
(2013) 487. „International arbitration has become the principal method of resolving disputes between 
States, individuals, and corporations in almost every aspect of international trade, commerce, and 
investment.‟ See Nigel Blackaby et al  Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration 5ed (2009) 1. 
2
 Gary B Born International Arbitration: Law and Practice (2012) 412. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Florentino P Feliciano „The Ordre Public dimensions of Confidentiality and Transparency in 
International Arbitration: Examining Confidentiality in the light of Governance Requirements in 
International Investment and Trade Arbitration‟ in Junji Nakagawa (ed) Transparency in International 
Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement (2013) 15. 
5
 Kyriaki Noussia Confidentiality In International Commercial Transaction: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Position under English, US, German and French Law (2010) 22. 
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proceedings and the protection of government documents as well as confidentiality of 
documents relating to the business of the investor.
6
  
Investor-State arbitration differs from general commercial arbitration in that it 
involves claims against the State, which are often related to regulation of a public law 
nature. This form of arbitration involves public issues not only because it relates to the 
liability of a State, but also because it often deals with various policies that are 
traditionally perceived to be within the sovereign regulatory power of the State.
7
 The 
concurrent and sometimes overriding public interest in arbitral process has in recent 
times shifted the emphasis from confidentiality to transparency and the development 
towards third-party participation in investor-State arbitration.  
The interest of the host State is intensely involved in investor-State arbitration. 
Hence, the need for transparency and the scope of exceptions to the confidentiality of 
information and documents generated in the arbitral process tends to expand, and access 
to such documents or information and participation by third parties becomes 
enormously important.
8
  
This recent development has resulted in States addressing issues related to 
procedural transparency in the investor-State dispute resolution provisions in regional 
and bilateral investment treaties/agreements,
9
 and the amendment of the arbitration rules 
of international arbitral institutions.
10
 
Against this background, the study examines the legal issues surrounding 
confidentiality in investor-State arbitration. Is the obligation of confidentiality absolute? 
                                                          
6
 Mabel I Egonu „Investor-State Arbitration under ICSID: A Case for Presumption against 
Confidentiality‟ (2007) 24(5) Journal of International Arbitration 479.  
7
 Maciej Zachariasiewicz, „Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: Can It Enhance the 
Transparency of Investment Dispute Resolution?‟ (2012) 29(2) Journal of International Arbitration 205 
at 206. 
8
 See Feliciano op cit note 4 at 25. 
9
 See, for example, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) available at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement, assessed on 5 August 2014; The 
Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and Dominican Republic (CAFTA-
DR) available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta/final-text, assessed on 5 August 2014; Japan-Mexico Foreign Trade 
Agreement, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf, assessed on 
5 August 2014 and Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aclfta/Documents/Australia-Chile-Free-Trade-Agreement.pdf, 
assessed on 5 August 2014. 
10
See ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf, 
assessed on 5 August 2014; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 and the new UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html, assessed on 5 August 2014. 
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To what extent is confidentiality preserved in investor-State arbitration? Does the drive 
towards transparency in investor-State arbitration absolutely exclude the obligation of 
confidentiality? On what ground(s) and to what extent should transparency and third-
party participation be employed in investor-State arbitration procedure? What standard, 
if any, is required to balance the demands for transparency against the need for 
confidentiality in investor-State arbitration? 
The study considers the background to the concept of confidentiality and 
discusses the nature and scope of the confidentiality obligation in investor-State 
arbitration. Chapter Two evaluates the duty of confidentiality in arbitral proceedings, 
the differences between the common law and civil law approach to the notions of 
implied duties of confidentiality and exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in 
investor-State arbitration in comparison with the exceptions under commercial 
arbitration. Chapter Three analyses the participation of non-disputing parties/third 
parties in investor-State arbitration, the rationale for third-party participation, criteria for 
considering third-party participation and the use of amici curiae in investor-State 
arbitration. Chapter Four analyses confidentiality under major institutional arbitration 
rules, conventions, agreements and treaties.  Chapter Five appraises the current trend in 
investment arbitration towards transparency and makes recommendations guiding a 
future approach to confidentiality in investment arbitration. 
The study explores the current dimension of confidentiality in relation to 
transparency in investor-State arbitration due to the growing development in recent 
years towards increased transparency, and considers the effectiveness of the 
transparency standard in investor-State arbitration.  
This introductory chapter introduces the concepts of confidentiality and privacy 
in arbitration, and identifies the particular features of these concepts in the context of 
investor-State arbitration. 
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II THE CONCEPT OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN ARBITRATION 
Confidentiality has been defined as a pure contractual creation born out of the parties‟ 
agreement.
11
 Confidentiality may also arise through the choice of an arbitration 
instrument containing a clause or a provision explicitly providing for an obligation of 
confidentiality in the arbitration proceedings.
12
 It has also been traditionally assumed, 
particularly in commercial arbitration, that „confidentiality is implied in every 
agreement to arbitrate for reasons of business efficacy or as a matter of law‟.13   
The term confidentiality may be expressed as the obligation to protect and 
control the disclosure of information that is not generally known to the public.
14
 It is the 
state of having the dissemination of certain information restricted,
15
 between persons 
who are or have been in a relationship of „confidence‟16 with each other.17 Confidential 
information is usually described as information that is not generally known or 
accessible to the public and, if disclosed, would cause or threaten to cause prejudice to 
an essential interest of any individual or entity, or to the interest of a party, or would be 
contrary to personal privacy.
18
 The confidentiality obligation not to disclose information 
that comes to one‟s knowledge will have its source in a law, rule or contract binding on 
the parties, arbitrators and others.
19
  
Confidentiality is generally seen as an important advantage of arbitration over 
litigation in the context of the resolution of commercial disputes. It is perceived as 
encouraging efficient and dispassionate dispute resolution by reducing the damaging 
disclosure of commercially–sensitive information and facilitating settlement in an 
amicable and business–like manner.20  
                                                          
11
Ileana M Smeureanu Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (2011) 9.  See also Julian 
DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis & Stefan M Kroll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(2003) 177 and Noussia op cit note 5 at 23. 
12
Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. See also Quentin Loh Sze On & Edwin Lee Peng Khoon Confidentiality in Arbitration: How Far 
Does It Extend? (2007) 10-16. 
14
 Rosemary Pattenden The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality (2003) 12. 
15
 Blacks Law Dictionary 9ed (2009). 
16
 Contractual relationship can give rise to variety of relationships between parties; some of which are of 
more private nature than others especially where there are no stipulations as to confidentiality.     
17
 Paul Stanley The Law of Confidentiality: A Restatement (2008) 3. 
18
UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 - Settlement of commercial disputes: 
Preparation of rules of uniform law on transparency in treaty-based investor-State dispute settlement (5 
August 2010) para 8, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V10/556/20/PDF/V1055620.pdf?OpenElement, assessed on 5 August, 2014. 
19
 Julian DM Lew „The Arbitrator and Confidentiality‟ in Yves Derains & Laurent Levy (eds) Is 
Arbitration as Good as the Arbitrator (2011) 107. 
20
 Born op cit note 2 at 195. 
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Confidentiality in arbitration is typically used to refer to the obligation not to 
disclose information concerning the arbitration to third parties. This obligation extends 
not only to prohibiting third parties from attending the arbitral proceedings, but also to a 
party‟s disclosure to third parties of the existence of the arbitral proceedings and  
information emanating from the proceedings such as; hearing transcripts, written 
pleadings and submissions, evidence adduced in the arbitration, materials produced 
during disclosure and arbitral award.
21
  
The private nature of arbitral proceedings has been intimately linked to 
confidentiality by proponents of confidentiality in international arbitration. It has been 
argued that the privacy of the arbitral process necessarily requires that it be confidential 
save contrary agreement by the parties.
22
 Fortier commented that: 
„The private nature of arbitral proceedings is well established 
and the concept of privacy would have no meaning if 
participants were required to arbitrate privately by day while 
being free to pontificate publicly by night. The duty is not 
absolute, argue its proponents, but the qualifications or 
exceptions that attach to it are just that: exceptions to a general 
rule.‟23 
Critics of confidentiality, however, argue that the mere fact that arbitration is 
private does not import the obligation of confidentiality.
24
 These commentators treat the 
concept of privacy narrowly, arguing that it does not necessarily entail or require 
broader confidentiality obligations.
25
  
It is generally accepted that arbitrations are private, in the sense that no third 
party has a right to have input, interfere with or attend the hearings without requisite 
consent. On the other hand, there are no absolute guarantees of confidentiality over 
information disclosed or produced during arbitration.
26
 It is therefore imperative to 
define the distinction between the concept of „privacy‟ and „confidentiality‟. 
                                                          
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 L Yves Fortier „The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality’ (1999) 15(2) 
Arbitration International 131 at 132.  
24
 Born op cit note 2 at 195. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Lew op cit note 19 at 106. 
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III DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY  
Privacy and confidentiality have varied meanings. In arbitration, privacy generally 
refers to the closed and non-public character of the arbitration process, which prevents 
public access to hearings. Confidentiality, however, refers to the secrecy of the 
existence of a dispute and information revealed during or in preparation of the 
arbitration process.
27
  
Confidentiality and privacy are two instruments designed to control third 
parties‟ access to arbitral proceedings and to the information exchanged in that 
process.
28
 The concept of privacy „derives from the fact that parties have agreed to 
submit particular disputes arising between them to arbitration‟.29 It is concerned with 
the right of third parties to know about the arbitral proceedings and attend the hearings. 
It does not relate to the arbitral process as a whole, but to those cases where hearings 
actually take place and the participation of third parties is otherwise agreed upon by the 
parties.
30
  
Consent to third party participation in arbitral proceedings is affected by the 
variations in privacy provisions in arbitration rules.
31
 Certain arbitral institutions require 
the consent of the parties only,
32
 while some other institutions require the consent of 
either the arbitrators or the parties.
33
  
An arbitral tribunal may permit, subject to the consent of the parties, the 
attendance of other persons at the hearing.
34
 This standard can be found in Rule 32(2) of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) Rules;  
„Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation 
with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides 
the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and 
experts during their testimony and officers of the Tribunal to 
attend or observe all or part of the hearings, subject to 
                                                          
27
 Noussia op cit note 5 at 38. 
28
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 3.  
29
 Peter Ramsden The Law of Arbitration South African and International Arbitration (2009) 122. 
30
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 4.  
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Article 28(3) of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 (as amended in 2013) provides that „hearings shall 
be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise‟. See also Article 28(3) of PCA Arbitration Rules 
2012 and Article 19(4) of LCIA Rules 2014 in contrast with the LCIA Rules 1998 which provides for the 
consent of the parties or the arbitral tribunal. 
33
See for example Article 28(3) of DIAC Rules 2007 available at http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/, 
accessed on 27 July 2014 which states that „all meetings and hearings shall be held in private unless the 
parties agree otherwise in writing or the Tribunal directs otherwise‟.  
34
 See Article 26(3) ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 and Article 33(1) of CEITAC Rules 2015 available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms, assessed on 15 January 2015. 
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appropriate logistical arrangements. The tribunal shall for such 
cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or 
privileged information.‟ 
Arbitration hearings are not open to the public without the parties‟ consent. 
Where the parties and the tribunal agree to permit third parties to attend, the tribunal 
shall put in place appropriate procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged 
information.
35
  
Confidentiality, on the other hand, goes further than privacy, and connotes a 
certain amount of secrecy which precludes disclosure of evidence, communication or 
other information disclosed in arbitral proceeding.
36
 Confidentiality is a state of secrecy 
attached to the materials created, presented and used in the context of the arbitral 
process,
37
 and the obligation not to disclose information concerning the arbitration to 
third parties.
38
 
Confidentiality transcends privacy, although both involve the element of 
secrecy.
39
 Though the two concepts are correlated, they differ significantly in nature. 
Confidentiality is wider than privacy as it extends to the whole arbitral process and is 
not limited to the hearing phase of arbitration. Privacy and confidentiality may overlap 
in the context of arbitral hearings, but this does not necessarily mean that all 
information disclosed during a private hearing is confidential.
40
  
IV NATURE AND SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN INVESTOR – STATE 
ARBITRATION 
As noted above, arbitration has traditionally been regarded as a private and confidential 
proceeding strictly focused on the resolution of disputes between two or more parties to 
an arbitration agreement.
41
 Investor-State arbitration largely evolved based on the model 
of international commercial arbitration, as a private and confidential process for 
resolving disputes with its own peculiar process whereby private investors bring claims 
                                                          
35
 Georgios Petrochilos, Silvia Noury & Daniel Kaldermis „ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings 2006‟ in Concise International Arbitration Loukas A Mistelis (ed) (2010) 267.   
36
 Noussia op cit note 5 at 40. 
37
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 5. 
38
 Born op cit note 2 at 195. 
39
 Noussia op cit note 5 at 26. 
40
 Confidentiality will not apply to information already in the public domain or one that is not confidential 
in nature. 
41
 Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard „Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment 
Arbitration‟ in Michael Waibel et al (eds) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and 
Reality (2010) 254. 
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against sovereign States hosting their investment under dispute resolution provisions in 
investment treaties/agreements.
42
 It is principally governed by ICSID Arbitration Rules 
or ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules with proceedings being conducted 
under the auspices of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute,
43
  and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on an ad hoc basis. 
Generally, investor-State arbitrations are significantly more transparent and less 
confidential than commercial arbitrations considering the nature of their framework and 
the call for transparency.
44
 The obligation of confidentiality primarily stems from the 
agreement between the parties, resulting directly from the arbitration agreement or 
indirectly from the rules of arbitration.
45
 It is widely argued that „there is no general 
duty of confidentiality in investor-State arbitration‟ based on the absence of general 
principle of confidentiality obligations in the principal procedural rules governing 
investor-State arbitration and the marked tendency towards transparency.
46
  
This however, does not mean that investor-State arbitration is entirely 
transparent. The scope of confidentiality does not necessarily affect the existence of the 
arbitral process, but broadly affects disclosures made and evidence produced during 
arbitral proceedings, restrictions on publication of the contents of the award and 
deliberations of the arbitrators.
47
 
(a) Confidentiality of the Arbitral Proceedings 
The extent to which confidentiality covers the existence of arbitral proceedings in 
investor-State arbitration varies under the different provisions of the arbitration 
agreement and arbitration rules.
48
 Arbitration rules seldom impose an obligation to 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. See Loukas A Mistelis, „Confidentiality and Third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and 
Methanex Corporation v. United States‟ (2005) 21(2) Arbitration International 205and Eugenia Levine, 
„Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party 
Participation‟ (2011) 29(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law 200 at 204: the „concept of privacy and 
confidentiality originates primarily from the foundational underpinnings of international commercial 
arbitration, but it has also to a considerable extent been translated into the investment context‟. 
43
 Investor-State arbitration may also be carried out under the auspices of other arbitral institution like the 
International Chamber of Commerce, Permanent Court of Arbitration, London Court of International 
Arbitration, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and governed by its respective Arbitration Rules. 
44
 Born op cit note 2 at 200. 
45
 Valery Denoix de Saint Marc „Confidentiality of Arbitration and the Obligation to Disclose 
Information in Listed Companies or During Due Diligence Investigations‟ 2003 20(2) Journal of 
International Arbitration 211. 
46
 Born op cit note 2 at 200-1; Mistelis op cit note 42 at 213-14; and Levine op cit note 43 at 204. 
47
 Denoix de Saint Marc op cit note 45 at 212. 
48
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 75.  
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maintain the secrecy concerning the existence of the arbitration or the commencement 
of arbitration.
49
 Information regarding the existence of arbitral proceedings is published 
under ICSID investment arbitration. Regulation 22 (1) of the ICSID Administrative and 
Financial Regulations provides that: 
„The Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information 
about the operation of the Centre, including the registration of 
all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in due course an 
indication of the date and method of the termination of each 
proceeding.‟50 
The information on all cases filed under the ICSID arbitral institution is 
accessible on the Centre‟s website with the aim of furthering the development of 
international law in relation to investments.
51
  A similar provision under Article 2 of the 
new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State Arbitration 
applicable to investor-State arbitration under treaties concluded after 1 April 2014,
52
  
stipulates the publication of information at the commencement of arbitration 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, confidentiality of arbitral proceedings affects public access to 
procedural documents, oral hearings and publication of awards. Traditionally, 
arbitration rules relate to the conduct of arbitral proceedings, as generally private, to the 
exclusion of third parties subject to the agreement of parties.
53
 Third parties with a 
significant interest are allowed to participate, with some limitations, in the dispute 
settlement proceedings in a manner analogous to a right to intervene.
54
  
The increasing number of investor-State arbitrations and the development as a 
dispute resolution mechanism in recent years has resulted in the revision of the major 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is generally silent on the confidentiality of the existence of 
arbitration proceedings.  
50
 ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, available at  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf, 
assessed on 22 August 2014.  
51
 ICSID arbitration cases, available at   
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx, assessed on 22 August 
2014. 
52
 New Rules on transparency adopted by UNCITRAL in 2013.The Rules came into effect on 1 April 
2014 and is applicable to investor-State arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
pursuant to treaty concluded on or after 1 April 2014 or by agreement in cases initiated pursuant to a 
treaty concluded before it came into effect. 
53
 See Article 28(3) of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 (as amended in 2013); Article 32(2) of ICSID 
Arbitration Rules 2006. 
54
 Other participants in the arbitral process, mainly amici curiae are permitted to make submissions in the 
case, but often times have restricted access to the oral hearings. See Rule 37(2) of ICSID Arbitration 
Rules 2006 in contrast with the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State 
Arbitration 2014 which allows access to oral hearings and documents. 
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arbitration rules applicable to treaty-based investor-State dispute resolution and 
international investment treaties/agreements to contain provisions on matters of public 
access to procedural documents, hearings and publication of awards.
55
 
The revised ICSID Arbitration Rules leaves the matter of public access to 
procedural documents, oral hearings and the publication of award(s), to the agreement 
of the parties, and in certain instances, such as third party participation as amicus 
curiae, to the arbitral tribunal‟s determination based on the relevant arbitration rules and 
law applicable to the arbitral procedure.
56
 A similar approach founded on consent of the 
parties to public access to arbitral proceedings exists under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.
57
 
On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
investor-State Arbitration provide general public access to oral hearings, procedural 
documents and awards subject to the protection of confidential information.
58
 
Further to the recent development, international investment agreements 
traditionally did not include transparency provisions. A majority of international 
investment agreements, particularly bilateral investment treaties, were concluded in the 
1990s without the discussion of procedural transparency at that time.
59
 Many 
international investment agreements refer to mechanisms inspired by international 
commercial arbitration as the main option for investor-State dispute resolution, which is 
by nature based on confidentiality of the proceedings.
60
   
Increase of cases involving investor-State disputes under international 
investment agreement in the last two decades, raised the issue of public access to 
hearings, procedural documents and awards, which triggered the development of 
provisions for procedural transparency in the dispute resolution clauses of the new 
generation international investment treaties/agreement.
61
  
This new dynamic has been considered desirable by States like the United States 
and Canada. Canada‟s Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
                                                          
55
 UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 op cit note 18 para 5. 
56
 Articles 32(2), 37(2) and 48(4) of ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006. 
57
 Article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 (as amended in 2013). 
58
 Articles 3, 4 and 7 of UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State Arbitration 
2014. 
59
 UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 op cit note 18 para 5. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. See Mistelis op cit note 42 at 214. 
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2004, for example, provide that „documents submitted to, or issued by, the arbitral 
tribunal shall be publicly available, unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, subject 
to the deletion of confidential information‟.62 It is, however, important to note that there 
is a great variation in international investment agreements and the position of States on 
the desirability of procedural transparency in investor-State dispute resolution. 
The obligation of confidentiality also extends to the arbitration tribunal with 
regard to the information presented, used and created in the course of the arbitral 
proceedings.
63
 Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules binds arbitrators with a general 
confidentiality obligation wherein an arbitrator must sign an undertaking stating that: 
„I shall keep confidential all information coming to my 
knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as 
well as the content of any awards made by the tribunal.‟ 
This provision thus protects the privacy of the arbitration proceedings. The 
declaration complements the arbitrator‟s attestation to his or her impartiality and the 
obligation to be just in the arbitration proceedings. 
(b) Confidentiality of Awards  
Generally, arbitral awards are confidential unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The 
orders and awards of arbitral tribunals may be published provided that the parties 
consent to the publication.
64
 Rule 48(4) of the revised ICSID Arbitration Rules reads:  
„The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of 
the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its 
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.‟ 
The additional requirement that the Centre shall promptly include in its 
publications, excerpts of the legal reasoning of awards mandatorily expands the scope 
of the publication of the awards and makes the reasons behind them more accessible to 
the public. If a party does not consent to the publication by the Centre, the Centre will, 
                                                          
62
 Ibid para 13. See Article 38 (3) - (8) of Canada‟s Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement 2004, available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf, assessed 
on 22 August 2014. See also Articles 4.6 and 15.20 of United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 
available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf, 
assessed on 22 August 2014. 
63
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 96. 
64
 See Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention; Article 34 (5) of UNCITRAL Arbitration rules 2010 (as 
amended in 2013); and Regulation 22(2) of the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations. 
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however, publish the excerpts of the legal reasoning of the award and any decision 
deemed to be part of the award.
65
 
(c) Confidentiality of Arbitrators’ Deliberations 
The deliberations of an arbitral tribunal are private, secret and to the exclusion of other 
persons.
66
 The arbitrators are not allowed to indicate the individual positions taken 
during the deliberations and cannot reveal information shared or used during decision 
making.
67
  
In the process of making an award, the members of the tribunal may express 
different views, which may result in dissenting opinions. Such separate opinions do not 
generally form part of the award,
68
 but may be attached to the award under Rule 47(3) 
of the ICSID Arbitration Rules without revealing the content of deliberations.  
V CONCLUSION 
Parties in investor-State arbitration are by agreement free to allow access to arbitration 
proceedings and to release information used in or connected to the arbitral process, 
including the award,
69
 save where there is an express agreement to the contrary.
70
   
Arbitrators are bound by strict rules of confidentiality regarding the communications 
and exchange of information between the parties in the arbitration proceedings.  
Though the existence of the arbitration proceedings is made known to the public, 
the information made available to the public by the arbitral institution under ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and practice is restricted to: the names of parties, subject matter of the 
                                                          
65
UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.167 - Settlement of commercial disputes: 
Transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration – Comments by the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (8 August 2010) para 11, available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V11/848/41/PDF/V1184841.pdf?OpenElement, assessed 
on 5 August 2014.  
66
 See Rule 15 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and Rule 23(1) of ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
67
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 80. 
68
Ibid at 49. In occasions where one of the members of the tribunal disagrees with others, the signature of 
the dissenting arbitrator is not required on the award, provided that the reason for any omitted signature is 
stated.  
69
The award will in principle, be confidential where one of the parties wishes to keep the arbitration 
process private and opposes the publication of the award. See Mistelis op cit note 42 at 207. 
70
 Blackaby & Richard op cit note 41 at 255. 
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dispute, date of registration, date of constitution of the tribunal, composition of the 
tribunal, parties‟ representatives and method of termination of the proceedings.71  
However, the existence of arbitration proceedings is generally not made public 
under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010 except in proceedings where 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency apply. They also, do not address the issue of 
public access to procedural documents, which therefore remains a matter to be agreed 
by parties or the arbitral tribunal, where such agreements do not exist.
72
 
In addition, rules of international arbitration institutions which govern a low 
percentage of investor-State arbitration,
73
 such as the LCIA Arbitration Rules, SSC 
Arbitration Rules and AAA International Arbitration Rules, express a duty of 
confidentiality on the parties and arbitral tribunal as regards matters relating to the 
arbitration, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
74
  However, the ICC Arbitration 
Rules and PCA Arbitration Rules contain no specific provision on public disclosure of 
the existence of proceedings, or public access to procedural documents.
75
  
As such, the applicable institutional rules in investor-State arbitration and the 
„consent-based nature‟ of arbitration have basically provided disputing parties with the 
ability to fashion investor-State arbitration proceedings to preserve privacy and 
confidentiality.
76
 The next Chapter evaluates the scope of the duty to maintain 
confidentiality and its limitations in investor-State arbitration. 
 
  
                                                          
71
 ICSID website at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx, 
assessed on 22 August 2014. 
72
 UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 op cit note 18 para 35. 
73
 UNCTAD Recent Development in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Issue 1 April, 2014) 4 available 
at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf, assessed on 22 August 2014. 
74
 See Article 19 and 30 of LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 46 of SCC Arbitration Rules, Article 27 and 
34 of AAA International Arbitration Rules. See also, UNCITRAL Working Group II Document 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 op cit note 18 para 40-6. 
75
 UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 op cit note 18 para 38 and 47. 
76
 Levine op cit note 42 at 205. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
I INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter sets out the scope of the duty to maintain confidentiality and the actors 
bound by the duty of confidentiality in international arbitration. The study considers the 
difference between the common law and civil law approach to the notions of implied 
duties of confidentiality; exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in investor-State 
arbitration; and a comparison of the limitations to the duty of confidentiality between 
commercial arbitration and investor-State arbitration.  
II THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATION IN 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
An obligation of confidentiality signifies the duty not to disclose information coming 
into one‟s knowledge.77  This obligation, as stated earlier in Chapter One, attaches 
basically to the arbitration proceedings, documents submitted or produced in the arbitral 
process and the award in investor-State arbitration.  
The sources of the duty of confidentiality are derived from: the agreement of the 
parties, confidentiality obligations in the arbitration rules chosen to govern the 
arbitration, the law governing the arbitration, ethical and professional rules, and the 
generally accepted arbitral practice.
78
 Each of these sources applies in varying degrees 
to all the actors in the arbitration process and the obligation imposed by the agreement. 
Laws and rules also attach in varying degrees to the type of information and document 
produced in the arbitration proceedings. 
The participants bound by the duty of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings 
can be classified in five major categories: the parties, the representatives of the parties, 
the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral institution and third parties, such as lay and expert 
witnesses participating in the proceedings. The extent to which these actors are bound 
by the obligations of confidentiality is more widely defined under commercial 
arbitration than investor-State arbitration, and extensively discussed below.  
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Lew op cit note 19 at 107.  
78
 Ibid at 108. 
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(a) Parties 
Parties can expressly agree to be bound by the duty of confidentiality. The scope of the 
confidentiality obligations will depend on what they agreed, and generally cannot bind 
other participants in the arbitration proceedings.  
The duty of confidentiality binds the parties either by express agreement or 
through the arbitration rules that provide for such obligation.
79
 This duty is generally 
defined by the law governing their arbitration agreement, especially where the parties 
expressly address the subject of confidentiality in their arbitration agreement.
80
 There is 
no general duty of confidentiality imposed on parties in the Law and Rules governing 
investor-State arbitration. In the case of Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. The 
Argentine Republic,
81
 the tribunal held that: 
„In the absence of any agreement between the parties …, there 
is no provision imposing a general duty of confidentiality in 
ICSID [International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Dispute] arbitration, whether in the ICSID Convention, any of 
the applicable Rules or otherwise.‟82 
Most investor-State arbitrations arise under a Bilateral or a multilateral 
investment treaty/agreement, and as a consequence, the principal applicable law in 
almost all investment arbitrations will be the provisions of the underlying treaty and 
general principles of international law.
83
  
Parties may however, expressly agree to be bound by the duty not to disclose 
confidential information. Absent an express agreement between the parties with respect 
to confidentiality, the duty of parties to maintain confidentiality may vary significantly 
depending upon the tribunal and the applicable law and procedures, as well as the type 
of information at issue and the way in which the information may be used.
84
 
 
                                                          
79
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 134. 
80
 Born op cit note 2 at 196. 
81
 Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/07/05, Procedural 
Order no. 2 (27 January 2010) available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=D
C1390_En&caseId=C95, assessed on 19 August 2014. 
82
 Ibid para 67. 
83
 Born op cit note 11 at 437. See also Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.  
84
 Cindy G Buys „The Tension Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration‟ 
(2003) 14 The American Review of International Arbitration 121 at 124. 
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(b) Representatives of the parties 
The duty of confidentiality that binds legal counsel involved in arbitration proceedings 
applies to the information disclosed by their client, the information and materials 
received from the opposing party, the tribunal and arbitral institution, as well as the 
information disclosed by witnesses and experts.
85
 This particular obligation of 
confidence does not have its root in arbitration, but emanates from the nature of the 
legal profession, ethical and professional rules.
86
 
(c) Arbitral Tribunal 
Arbitrators‟ duty of confidentiality arises as part of the ethical obligations stemming 
from the role of a decision-maker and from the contractual nature of the relationship, 
arising from the arbitration agreement or the arbitration rules.
87
  
Arbitrators, once appointed and confirmed, are bound to keep confidential: 
information known in the course of arbitration proceedings, their deliberations during 
decision making, and the contents of the award. The ICSID Arbitration Rules, for 
instance, expressly provide that each arbitrator must sign a confidentiality declaration 
before or at the end of the first session.
88
  
(d) Arbitral Institutions 
The arbitral institution‟s duty to maintain confidentiality in investor-State arbitration 
applies to documents submitted and produced in the arbitration process, orders and the 
award. Documents submitted by parties to the arbitral tribunal, minutes or records of 
proceedings are not published without the consent of both parties.
89
 Likewise the award 
made in an arbitration proceeding.
90
  
(e) Third Parties 
It is generally accepted that third parties such as lay or expert witnesses are not bound 
by any duty of confidentiality, absent any specific contractual obligation.
91
  This 
                                                          
85
 Smeureanu op cit note 11 at 139. 
86
 Mistelis op cit note 42 at 210-11. 
87
 Ibid at 142-3. See Lew op cit note 19 at 117. 
88
See Rule 6(2) and 15 of ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006. 
89
 UNCITRAL Working Group II Document A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.167 op cit note 65 para 9.  
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 See Rule 48(5) of ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006. 
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 Buys op cit note 84 at 124. 
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contractual obligation is often defined in the contractual relationship between the 
witness and the disputing party. Third parties may, be invited to enter into a 
confidentiality agreement and consent to be bound by it. 
As discussed above, the legal bases from which the duty to maintain 
confidentiality are the express agreement of parties and arbitration law and rules. It is 
however, generally established in common law jurisdictions that an enforceable and 
implied duty of confidentiality arises out of the private nature of arbitration.
92
 The 
question is: does the notion of implied duty of confidentiality exist in investor-State 
Arbitration? 
III IMPLIED DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
Common and civil law jurisdictions treat the notions of implied duty of confidentiality 
differently. In many instances, the parties do not agree to confidentiality provisions in 
their arbitration agreements.
93
 In these cases, the common law jurisdictions, through 
their national courts have reached a variety of conclusions with regard to the duty of 
confidentiality in arbitration (particularly commercial arbitration). Some courts have 
recognized confidentiality obligations, implied from the existence of an agreement to 
arbitrate. In contrast, other common law courts have rejected the notion of implied 
obligation of confidentiality, holding that such an agreement must be express.
94
  
Certain countries, such as the United Kingdom, France and the Philippines, 
recognize a general duty of confidentiality in international arbitration. Other countries 
such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand reject the notion of general duty 
of confidentiality, unless established by applicable law, the lex arbitri, or by common 
consent of the parties.
95
 These dissenting jurisdictions are of the view that privacy of 
arbitration proceedings does not necessarily impose a duty of confidentiality and refuse 
to recognize an implied obligation of confidentiality as an attribute of arbitration seated 
in their respective jurisdictions.
96
 
The notion of confidentiality emerged and developed along with the concept of 
privacy in arbitration proceedings, from which third parties are generally excluded. 
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 Noussia note 5 at 17. 
93
 Born op cit note 2 at 197. 
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 Ibid. 
95
 Feliciano op cit note 4 at 16. 
96
 Born op cit note 2 at 198. See Esso Australia Resources Limited v. Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; and 
United States of America v. Panhandle Eastern Corporation 118 F.R.D 346 (D. Del. 1988). 
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English courts have repeatedly held that arbitration agreements give rise to implied 
obligations of confidentiality. Leggatt, J (as he then was) in Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd v. 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, reasoned that: 
„The concept of private arbitrations derives simply from the 
fact that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration, 
particular disputes arising between them and only between 
them. It is implicit in this that strangers shall be excluded from 
the hearing and conduct of the arbitration…‟97 
The privacy of the arbitration proceedings is held to imply the confidentiality of 
information disclosed during proceedings, as an implied obligation derived from the 
arbitration agreement.
98
 Parker, J in Dolling Baker v. Merret noted that in every 
arbitration agreement, it was implied that the documents created exclusively for the 
purpose of arbitration would remain confidential in the course of and after the closing of 
the proceedings, save the consent of parties, or pursuant to an order or leave of the 
court.
99
 
Subsequent English decisions affirmed and developed the implied obligation of 
confidentiality, explaining it as a general principle implied by law,
100
 and stating the 
guidelines regarding the nature of confidentiality obligation applicable to particular 
categories of information and documents.
101
 Colman, J in Hassneh Insurance Co. of 
Israel v. Mew held that an implied contractual term of confidentiality in arbitration 
applied to: documents created for the arbitration and/or by the arbitral process such as 
transcripts and pleadings, and documents disclosed during the arbitral process such as 
documents produced in disclosure.
102
 The court emphasized confidentiality of non-
public materials submitted in arbitration proceedings while permitting more liberal 
disclosure of arbitral awards in order to protect a party‟s legal rights. 103 
Conversely, decisions of other common law jurisdiction, particularly in 
Australia and United States, recognized the private nature of arbitration but rejected 
                                                          
97
 Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha [1984] 3 All E.R. 835 at 842 cited in Loh & Lee op 
cit note 13 at 1.See also Dolling-Baker v. Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205; and Hassneh Insurance Co. of 
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 See Born op cit note 2 at 198. 
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 Dolling-Baker v. Merrett supra note 97 at 1213. 
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 Born op cit note 2 at 198. 
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 Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew supra note 97 at 250. See also Ali Shipping Corp v. Shipyard 
Trogir supra note 100; Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v. European Reinsurance Co. 
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EWCA Civ. 184. 
103
 Ibid. See; Loh & Lee op cit note 13 at 12. 
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claims of an implied obligation of confidentiality.
104
 The court in Esso Australia 
Resources Limited v. Plowman held that the mere fact that parties agree to resolve their 
dispute through arbitration does not import any legal or equitable duty of confidentiality 
in the course of arbitration.
105
 The court also held that parties are free to agree to 
express confidentiality obligations in an agreement. 
This position tends to be followed in civil law jurisdictions, stating that the 
confidentiality obligation between parties in an arbitration proceeding could only arise 
as a contractual creation, through an express agreement by the parties. This approach 
has been upheld by courts of civil law jurisdiction, with the exception of the French 
courts.
106
 For instance, the Swedish Supreme Court in Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank 
Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin. Inc. held that „a party to arbitration proceedings cannot be deemed 
to be bound by a duty of confidentiality, unless the parties have concluded an agreement 
concerning this‟.107 
The notion that arbitration proceedings are generally private but not confidential 
by virtue of an implied obligation arising from the parties‟ agreement to arbitrate is 
most clearly adopted in investor-State arbitration. Parties are free to include express 
confidentiality provisions in their agreement to arbitrate.
108
 The tribunal in Biwater 
Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania
109
 held that: 
„Parties are free, of course, to conclude any agreements they 
choose concerning confidentiality. Any such agreements would 
give rise to rights that are susceptible of protection by way of 
provisional measures or other appropriate relief.‟110 
                                                          
104
 Born op cit note 2 at 198. 
105
 Esso Australia Resources Limited v. Plowman supra note 96 at 30. 
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cited in Born op cit note 106 para 20.03 at 2798. 
108
 See Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1 
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Any confidentiality provisions in the parties‟ arbitration agreement are binding 
only on the parties themselves, and not on third parties.
111
 There are however, 
circumstances where non-parties consent to be bound by confidentiality agreement and 
order.
112
  
The reason why parties enter into confidentiality agreements is to ensure greater 
protection of the information disclosed in the arbitration proceedings. The sole fact that 
parties enter into such agreements, however, does not necessarily guarantee the 
observance of the confidentiality obligation stipulated in the agreement under all 
circumstances. These obligations are subject to exceptions which lift the duty to 
maintain confidentiality in number of circumstances. 
IV EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
The private nature of arbitration and the obligation to maintain the duty of 
confidentiality is not absolute.
113
 The principle of privacy and confidentiality are in 
certain circumstances subject to limitations under international commercial arbitration 
and investor-State arbitration respectively. Limitations on the duty of confidentiality, 
particularly the public interest exception, are more prominent in investor-State 
arbitration, due to the involvement of the State as party and the direct inquiry into its 
functions and policies.
114
 In contrast, a minority of cases in commercial disputes may 
involve a State or state entity as a contracting party.
115
 
Generally, the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are justified by the 
element of public interest in the subject matter of the dispute, the parties‟ consent to 
disclosure and the existing obligation to disclose under the law.  
                                                          
111
 Born op cit note 2 at 197. 
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 (a) Consent of Parties 
This exception has a wider application in commercial arbitration. It is generally 
accepted that the obligation of confidentiality in commercial arbitration has a 
consensual nature and attaches through the parties‟ agreement, whether express or 
implied, or their chosen set of arbitration rules or applicable laws containing a provision 
to that effect.
116
 Since arbitration is consensual, it must follow that both parties can 
waive the obligation of confidentiality.
117
 The agreement to disclose may be express
118
 
or implied depending on the conduct of the parties.
119
 
In investor-State arbitration, parties are generally free to speak publicly of the 
arbitration and are not precluded from providing public access to documents submitted 
or issued in the arbitration proceedings.
120
 As discussed above, parties may expressly 
agree to keep certain information confidential. Arbitral tribunals have also identified a 
specific duty not to disclose specific documents filed in the arbitration.
121
  
In their agreement parties can, however, provide that confidential information 
shall not be disclosed to any third party except with the prior consent of the disputing 
party.  In the case of Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of 
America
122
 where the subject matter related to a pharmaceutical enterprise, the parties 
stated in clause 4 of the confidentiality agreement ordered by the tribunal, that 
‘confidential information shall not be disclosed to any third party, except with a prior 
written order of the disputing party that claimed confidentiality with respect to the 
information‟.  
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(b) Public Interest 
The application of the „public interest exception‟ is not, however, limited to arbitration 
in which a State or State entity is involved, but also applicable to cases involving 
private contracting parties.
123
 The level of public interest in arbitration proceedings is 
higher in investor-State arbitration compared to commercial arbitration.
124
  
The public interest exception in commercial dispute involving a public actor was 
upheld in the case of Esso Australia Resources Limited v Plowman, where the public 
energy authorities were involved in arbitration proceedings with their suppliers and the 
minister responsible for the authorities applied to the courts for a declaration that the 
public authority was not subject to any confidentiality obligation and could disclose 
information regarding the arbitration. The court held that there may be circumstances in 
which third parties and the public have a legitimate interest in knowing what has 
transpired in an arbitration and this would give rise to a public interest exception.
125
  
Investor-State disputes involve issues of public interest not only in the 
substantive and financial outcome of the arbitration, but also in the arguments and 
factual assertions exchanged during the process. The subject matter of the disputes 
affect the daily lives of the citizens, and impacts the cost and availability of public 
service. These cases penetrate deeply into domestic policy-making and affect policies 
that protect public health, safety and the environment.  
The tribunal in Methanex Corp. v United States of America emphasized the 
public interest element inherent in disputes involving a State and importance of 
transparency in public interest arbitrations (investor-State arbitration). The tribunal 
reasoned that: 
„There is undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The 
substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual 
transnational arbitration between commercial parties. This is 
not merely because one of the disputing parties is a State… the 
public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-matter, 
as powerfully suggested in the Petitions.‟
126
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Imminent in the subject matter of certain investment disputes are the 
environmental and public health issues, which can have serious economic and social 
impacts on the disputing state parties. This is not just because a State is the respondent 
to the claim and public money is at stake, but also because the dispute may concern, for 
instance, rights to the natural resources of that State, or maintenance of a public utility, 
such as the provision of water, electricity, or gas supply to a large population.
127
   
In the Methanex case held under NAFTA Chapter 11 and UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the Canadian company, Methanex filed a claim against United States 
contending that the measures taken by the State of California to restrict the use of 
MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether) constituted a trade and investment restriction 
intended to achieve the goal of promoting domestic ethanol industry through sham 
environmental regulations. Methanex was a producer of methanol, a liquid petro-
chemical used in the production of MTBE and the use of MTBE in gasoline posed an 
environmental threat to California‟s ground waters, which is the State‟s main source of 
water, necessitating the measures imposing a ban on the use of MTBE in gasoline.  
Considering the significant impact of the case on environment and public health, 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) made an application for 
permission to file an amicus brief, and to have access to the claimant‟s memorial and 
the respondent‟s counter-memorial; permission to make oral submissions at the hearing; 
and permission to have observer status at the hearings.
128
  
The NAFTA tribunal which was operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules held that it had the power to receive amicus submissions under Article 15 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and concluded that: 
„Allowing a third person to make an amicus submission could 
fall within its procedural powers over the conduct of the 
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arbitration within the general scope of Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.‟129  
With regard to the petitioners‟ other applications to receive copies of materials 
filed by parties, attend hearings, and make oral submissions, the tribunal held that, in 
light of the provision of Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and the 
terms of the Consent Order agreed upon between the disputing parties, it had „no power 
to accept the Petitioners‟ request to receive materials generated within the arbitration or 
to attend oral hearings of the arbitration‟.130 
The public interest exception to confidentiality flowing from the protection of 
public health and environmental issues has also been established in arbitration between 
private entities, in which case disclosure of confidential information might be permitted. 
In the case of Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Property Ltd,
131
 a 
journalist requested release of information under the Freedom of Information Act 1982, 
in relation to an arbitration between the parties which essentially concerned the 
environmental conditions around the Cockatoo Island. The arbitrator in his award 
directed both parties to maintain confidentiality despite Australia‟s argument that an 
order of confidentiality would restrict the free flow of information and would also 
impinge upon governmental powers. On the application to court, Kirby, J held that it is 
both significant and urgent that information should be made available, for the protection 
of public health and the restoration of the environment, both to various governmental 
agencies or even to the public.
132
 
Another contributing ground for public interest participation in arbitration 
proceedings is the use of public funds, as successful claimants (investors) generally 
receive monetary awards as compensation to the value of the loss caused by the host 
State, including the loss of future profits.
133
 The size of these awards puts an enormous 
drain on State finances. These funds inevitably reduce the amount of money the State 
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can use to fund ongoing economic and social projects for the overall benefit of its 
citizens.
134
    
(c) Compulsion by Law 
This exception largely rests on the provisions of legislation.
135
 There are diverse statutes 
imposing the obligation to disclose confidential information, and giving power to 
various government or semi-government agencies to require the production of 
documents and information.
136
  
Legal and regulatory provisions may require companies and financial 
institutions to disclose information about disputes submitted to arbitration, which would 
incidentally affect the activities of such companies or institutions.
137
 The duty of 
disclosure might arise when there is a legal or ethical duty to provide information to 
auditors, shareholders, public regulators, or specified third parties.
138
 This obligation 
may also arise in a due diligence investigation into the processes of a sale of a company, 
where the seller is bound by the duty of good faith to disclose the existence of an 
arbitration proceeding.
139
 
In the case of Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States held under the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules and NAFTA, Metalclad provided information about the 
arbitration to shareholders, analysts and other members of the public who were 
interested in their activities. Mexico, however, sought an order from the tribunal 
securing confidentiality, arguing that the guarantee of confidentiality is implicit in 
arbitration. The tribunal rejected the Mexican argument and pointed out that none of the 
provisions of NAFTA and Additional Facility Rules imposed any confidentiality 
requirement on the parties. The tribunal held that „unless the agreement between the 
parties incorporates such a limitation, each of them is still free to speak publicly of the 
arbitration‟.140 It noted that there was a duty on Metalclad, which is a publicly listed 
company under the laws of United States, to provide shareholders with information that 
can affect share price. 
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The tribunal, however, urged the parties to keep disclosure to a minimum by holding 
that: 
„[I]t still appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that it would be of 
advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and 
conducive to the tenance of working relations between the 
Parties if during the proceedings they were both to limit public 
discussion of the case to a minimum, subject to any externally 
imposed obligation of disclosure by which either of them may 
be legally bound.‟141 
Finally, issues involving criminal elements such as bribery, corruption, money 
laundering, fraud and the like in arbitration have been pointed out to be a limitation on 
the principle of confidentiality.
142
  
 V CONCLUSION  
The scope of the duty to maintain confidentiality in investor-State arbitrations is 
different from that in the commercial context. Arbitration proceedings and submissions 
in investor-State arbitrations as established above are significantly more transparent and 
less confidential. The tribunal in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic 
of Tanzania noted that „considerations of confidentiality and privacy have not played 
the same role in the field of investment arbitration as they have in international 
commercial arbitration and that there is now a marked tendency towards transparency in 
treaty arbitration‟.143 
At the same time, arbitral tribunals have displayed reservations concerning the 
publication of materials from arbitration proceedings. They have, while acknowledging 
a trend towards transparency in investor-State arbitrations, shown concerns for 
procedural integrity and non-aggravation of the parties‟ dispute. The ICSID tribunal 
emphasized in The Loewen Group v. United States of America that: 
„It would be of advantage to the orderly unfolding of the 
arbitral process if during the proceedings [parties] were to limit 
public discussion of the case to what is considered 
necessary.‟144  
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The tribunal in Biwater Gauff further emphasized that its mandate and 
responsibility includes ensuring that the proceedings will be conducted in a regular, fair 
and orderly manner, ensuring that potential inhibitions and unfairness do not arise and 
attempting to reduce the risk of „future aggravation and exacerbation‟ of the dispute.145 
It is, however, clear from the above that transparency of arbitration proceedings 
and the disclosure of information and documents produced in the arbitration process are 
subject to the overriding public interest and the legal and regulatory requirements of 
disclosure. These factors, constituting exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, form the 
legal basis for the participation of non-disputing/third parties in the arbitration process. 
The next Chapter analyses the participation of non-disputing parties/third parties and its 
implications for investor-State arbitration.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
I  INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter analyses the participation of non-disputing parties/third parties in investor-
State arbitration. In recent years, there has been a shift in investor-State arbitration 
towards third-party participation,
146
 as investment disputes raise public interest issues 
traditionally absent from international commercial arbitration.
147
  
The rapid development of investor-State arbitration as a form of dispute 
settlement has been accompanied by the fundamental tension between the consensual 
nature of arbitration and the increasing demand to offer transparent proceedings where a 
public interest is involved.
148
 The development towards openness and transparency has 
led to demands from individuals and interest groups for participation in investor-State 
arbitration.
149
 The Chapter considers the rationale for third-party participation, criteria 
for considering third-party participation and the use of amici curiae in investor-State 
arbitration. 
II  THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
Arbitration proceedings generally involve the disputing parties to the arbitration 
agreement, their legal representatives, witnesses and the arbitration tribunal. As 
established in previous Chapters, arbitration proceedings are generally private and 
third/non-disputing parties are not allowed to participate in the arbitral process without 
the clear consent of the disputing parties.  
The increase in the number of investment disputes between foreign investors and 
host States is particularly significant because of the increasing number of cases 
involving matters of public policy, such as environmental regulation, protection of 
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public health and safety, and the provision of public services, in which the public 
clearly has a legitimate interest.150 
Given the profound impact international investment arbitration can have on the 
rights and welfare of the people and communities, some commentators have argued that 
international investment dispute settlement processes leading to important public policy 
decisions should be transparent and allow public input.
151
 
Also, developments in investor-State arbitration over the last decade show the 
significant efforts made by non-governmental organizations and non-profit institutions 
aimed at ensuring that arbitration under investment treaties/agreements should not be as 
private as international commercial arbitration.
152
  
Against this background, third/non-disputing parties have successfully drawn 
upon the public character of trade and foreign investment disputes to gain access to the 
proceedings as amici curiae.
153
 Interested parties such as civil society groups, non-
governmental organizations, academic institutions, and other form of non-profit 
organizations now rely on participation as amicus curiae (or third party intervention) as 
an avenue to include broader interests in investor-State arbitration.
154
 These non-
governmental institutions further indicate their intention to attend arbitration 
proceedings as observers, possibly with the right to access disputing parties‟ arbitration 
documents and the potential right to submit briefs on the subject matter of the dispute as 
amicus curiae.
155
  
Although investor-State arbitration is generally assumed to be semi-public, 
based largely on the public interest nature of the subject matter of the dispute, the 
participation of third/non-disputing parties does not necessarily imply the suspension of 
privacy and confidentiality of documents in investor-State arbitration.
156
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III  THE CONCEPT OF AMICUS CURIAE IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 
Third parties, or non-disputing parties,
157
 often participate in investment dispute 
resolution mechanisms as amicus curiae.
158
 An amicus curiae (literally „friend of the 
court‟) is a party likely to assist the court or tribunal in arriving at its decision.159 The 
purpose of amicus curiae submissions is to enlighten the arbitral tribunal in its decision-
making process,
160
 by providing it with „arguments, expertise, and perspectives that the 
parties may not have provided‟.161 
The amicus curiae brief is an ancient legal instrument of Roman law origin with 
early and frequent application in the common law tradition.
162
  The concept of amicus 
curiae is accepted in a number of domestic legal systems and has recently gained 
recognition in international proceedings as well.
163
  
The contemporary concept of amicus curiae was developed by the courts of 
England in the seventeenth century with its subsequent recognition in United States, 
where it has enjoyed great application.
164
 The purpose and form of amicus curiae brief 
across jurisdictions is, however, not a uniform one.
165
 An amicus curiae under English 
law is an independent advocate appointed by the court to address an issue of law on 
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which it lacks assistance.
166
 Conversely, in the United States, the role of amicus curiae 
has shifted to include advocacy for a third party interest, which the court might 
consider. 
167
  
While the concept of amicus curiae developed as a legal instrument primarily 
used in courts, it has recently gained attention in international investment arbitration.
168
 
The arbitral tribunal in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and 
Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic
169
 stated that the role 
of amicus curiae is similar to that of a friend of the court recognized in certain legal 
systems and more recently in a number of international proceedings.
170
 The tribunal 
further stated that „an amicus curiae, as the Latin words indicate, a “friend of the court,” 
is not a party to the proceeding‟ and the traditional role of an amicus curiae in an 
adversarial proceeding is to help the decision maker arrive at its decision.
171
  
Third-party participation in the form of amicus curiae ordinarily takes the form 
of written submissions under the applicable arbitration rules in investor-State arbitration 
and is justified on the basis that the amicus curiae is in a position to provide the tribunal 
its special perspective or expertise in relation to the dispute.
172
 
IV  THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 
The first recognition of third/non-disputing party participation as amicus curiae was by 
the arbitral tribunal in Methanex Corp. v United States of America,173 being the first 
tribunal to consider the issue of amicus curiae with no guidance from the NAFTA treaty 
or the arbitration rules (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976) which governed the 
dispute.
174
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There were no express powers in either NAFTA Chapter Eleven or the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that allowed or prohibited the tribunal to accept amicus 
briefs.
175
 The tribunal, examining the provision of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(1976) examined among other issues whether the acceptance of amicus curiae 
submissions fell within the general scope of article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules and 
whether it could affect the equal treatment of the parties or their opportunity to present 
their case.
176
   
The tribunal pointed out that although article 15(1) confers wide procedural 
powers on the tribunal, it has no power to add third parties to the proceedings without 
the parties‟ consent. It further noted that an amicus petition is not adding a third party, 
but merely allows receipt of submissions by non-disputing parties and hence leaves the 
parties‟ procedural and substantive rights unaltered.177 
Accordingly, the tribunal held that the admissibility of an amicus curiae 
submission fell within the procedural powers of the tribunal and importantly noted that 
„the receipt of written submissions from a non-party third person does not necessarily 
offend the philosophy of international arbitration involving States and non-State 
parties‟.178   
The tribunal also concluded it had power to accept amicus curiae submissions 
but had no power to accept the request of the petitioner to receive materials generated 
within the arbitration or to attend oral hearings.
179
 It commented that the petitioners‟ 
submissions could assist the tribunal,
180
 and conceded that there may be an additional 
burden placed upon one of the parties. In an effort to prevent the occurrence of 
additional burden, the tribunal committed itself by offering whatever procedural 
protection might be necessary.
181
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The next case to consider the issue of amicus curiae submission was United 
Parcel Service of America v. Canada,182 a case brought against Canada for alleged 
illegal monopolistic practices, wherein the arbitral tribunal considered a request to 
intervene by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers as amicus curiae whose members 
would allegedly be gravely affected by the tribunal‟s decision.  
Drawing upon the decision in Methanex case, the tribunal determined that the 
scope of article 15(1) is procedural in nature, indicating that no formal right of 
participation exists for non-disputing parties.
183
 The tribunal decided that article 15(1) 
grants the tribunal the power to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate,
184
 but initially refused to exercise it and noted that it was inappropriate to 
allow amicus curiae briefs with respect to jurisdictional issues.
185
  
The tribunal, however, ultimately granted leave to file an amicus curiae 
submission and further clarified in the Procedural Order made on 1 August 2003
186
 that 
the tribunal would accept written submissions from third/non-disputing parties, no new 
issues might be raised by the third/non-disputing parties, third/non-disputing parties 
would not have access to confidential information protected under the confidentiality 
order of 4 April 2003 and the ability to respond to all amici curiae submissions 
remained with all the parties involved. 
In 2003, the first ICSID tribunal to consider the issue of amicus curiae 
participation denied a petition made by an NGO to intervene in the case of Aguas del 
Tunari v. The Republic of Bolivia.
187
 The tribunal found that „the interplay of the ICSID 
Convention, the BIT, and the consensual nature of arbitration left the decision as 
regards amicus curiae participation in the parties to the arbitration‟. It therefore, 
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to admit amicus curiae briefs over the objections of 
a party to a dispute.
188
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The ICSID tribunal in Suez, Sociedad de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic
189
 espoused a different approach and confirmed 
the power of the tribunal to accept amicus curiae briefs pursuant to article 44 of the 
ICSID Convention,
190
 which states that „[I]f any question of procedure arises which is 
not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, 
the Tribunal shall decide the question‟. 
The tribunal stated that the admission of an amicus curiae submission was a 
procedural question over which Article 44 of the ICSID Convention grants it the power 
to admit amicus curiae submissions from suitable non-disputing parties in appropriate 
cases.
191
 
The tribunal set out three criteria for admitting amicus curiae submissions, 
namely: the appropriateness of the subject-matter,
192
 the suitability of a given non-party 
to act as amicus curiae in the case,
193
 and the procedure by which the amicus 
submission is made and considered, which led to the tribunal‟s decision that third/non-
disputing parties seeking to file amicus submission must first make an application to act 
as amicus curiae.
194
 The tribunal granted an opportunity to Petitioners to apply for leave 
to make amicus curiae submissions in accordance with the conditions stated above.
195
 
In the subsequent Order made in 2007 on amicus curiae submissions,
196
 the 
tribunal, acknowledging the new provision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules on 
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submissions of non-disputing parties,
197
 determined that the Petitioners may file single 
joint amicus curiae submission. However, the tribunal denied access to the parties‟ 
written pleadings and evidence, on the basis that „the role of the amicus curiae is not to 
challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the parties‟ but rather to provide the 
tribunal with „their perspective, expertise and arguments‟ likely to be of assistance in 
making a good decision.
198
 
  In a parallel case, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and 
Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
199
 the same arbitral 
tribunal confirmed its power to allow the filing of amicus curiae submissions but denied 
the application on the basis that the criteria for amicus submission had not been met.
200
 
The tribunal concluded that „amicus submissions on jurisdictional issues would not be 
appropriate, under the standards set by the tribunal, as they would not assist the 
Tribunal in its task of assessing jurisdiction‟.201 
Following these developments, the ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended in 
April 2006 expressly to regulate the submission of amicus briefs.
202
 The ICSID Rules 
were silent with respect to amicus curiae questions until the 2006 revisions, although 
the practice had already emerged for tribunals to accept such briefs.
203
 
The revised ICSID Rules explicitly include a provision relating to the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs. The revised Rules integrate the outcome of Suez et 
al v. Argentine Republic in an explicit provision, Rule 37(2), allowing tribunals to 
accept amicus curiae briefs, with or without the consent of the parties,
204
 and sets out 
the tests to be applied by an arbitral tribunal in exercising its discretion to accept or 
otherwise, any particular petition for amicus curiae submission.  
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The new ICSID Arbitration Rule was applied for the first time in Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Limited v. The United Republic of Tanzania,
205
 a case on the termination of 
a water concession, which, according to the Claimant constituted expropriation of the 
Claimant‟s investment and a breach of the Respondent‟s obligations under international 
and domestic law.
206
 
Five Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) specializing in environmental, 
human rights, and sustainable development issues filed an application for amicus curiae 
status, contending that the „arbitration raises issues of vital concern to the local 
community in Tanzania and developing countries that have privatized or are 
contemplating a possible privatization of, water or other infrastructure services‟.207 
The Petitioners pointed out that the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules have 
explicitly given tribunals the power to allow for submissions of non-disputing parties.
208
 
The Petitioners argued that: 
„Rule 37(2) establishes the right of third parties to apply for 
amicus curiae status. This right does not extend to a right to 
have such submissions accepted by the tribunal, or for them to 
form a basis for the final award if they are so accepted. On the 
other hand, it does establish a right to make a full presentation 
to the tribunal in order to be able to meet the test for acceptance 
as an amicus curiae.‟209  
The Petitioners highlighted that the right to apply for amicus curiae submissions 
is now explicit and that not only does the tribunal have the jurisdiction to accept such 
submissions, but may do so without the approval of one or both of the disputing 
parties.
210
 
The tribunal, adopting the decisions in Methanex case and Suez et al v Argentine 
Republic (ARB/03/19) case, granted the Petitioners the opportunity to file a written 
submission pursuant to the satisfaction of the requirements in Rule 37(2) of the ICSID 
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Arbitration Rules.
211
 It however denied the Petitioners access to the oral hearings in the 
absence of both parties‟ consent in accordance with Article 32(2) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules
212
 and parties‟ written pleadings, on the basis that amicus curiae did 
not require access to such arbitration documents in order to „address broad policy issues 
concerning sustainable development, environment, human rights and governmental 
policy‟, which are in the public domain.213  
A similar amendment was made to the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) 
Rules, which provide for submission of amicus curiae briefs in Rule 41(3) and was 
relied upon by the Petitioners in Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of 
South Africa.
214
 The arbitral tribunal equally allowed the Petitioners to file amici curiae 
submissions.
215
 
Following the amendments made to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the 
development towards the need to incorporate transparency standards in UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-
State Arbitration were adopted, effective on 1 April 2014. The Rules were established 
bearing in mind, the wide use of arbitration rules for the settlement of investment 
disputes and the need for transparency in the settlement of such dispute, taking account 
of the public interest involved in investor-State arbitration.
216
 
V  THE STANDARD FOR THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS 
CURIAE 
In the context of investor-State arbitration, the admissions of amicus briefs resulted 
from initiatives taken by arbitral tribunals in the exercise of their procedural discretion, 
which were later endorsed through amendments to the applicable procedural rules. The 
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admission of these briefs was justified on the basis that they assist tribunals by 
providing them with perspectives and expertise different from those provided by the 
parties, they increase transparency in investment arbitration by providing the public 
with insights into the investment arbitration process, and they cure the democratic 
deficit by fostering public participation in the decision making process.
217
 
The original provisions of the principal procedural rules governing investor-
State arbitration – the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the ICSID Arbitration Rules – 
do not provide for third party participation in the arbitral process or for public access to 
the proceedings.
218
  
As established above, recent developments in investor-State arbitration and the 
outstanding decisions made by arbitral tribunal with regards to amicus curiae 
submission have contributed to the amendments made to the legal framework of 
investor-State arbitration.
219
 
The authority of the arbitral tribunal to consider the participation of amicus 
curiae and the criteria to be applied in considering third/non-disputing parties 
participation shall be analysed by considering: the capacity to apply as an amicus 
curiae, written submissions by amicus curiae, participation in oral hearings and access 
to disputing parties‟ arbitration documents. 
(a)  Capacity to Apply as an Amicus Curiae 
The early cases granting third/non-disputing party intervention in investor-State 
arbitration overwhelmingly involved NGOs and civil society groups.
220
 NGOs have 
intervened in high-profile arbitrations, in order to provide expertise on thematic issues 
of public policy implicated in the dispute.
221
  
The essential question is whether any natural or legal person, irrespective of 
legal form and type of activity, may participate in investor-State arbitration as amicus 
curiae, or whether participation is reserved for NGOs and civil society groups serving 
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the general public interest.
222
 Third/non-disputing party intervention has more recently 
expanded beyond NGOs and civil society groups to other types of legal entities, 
recognized by arbitral tribunals to act as amicus curiae in investor-State arbitration.
223
  
In Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of America,
224
 a dispute concerning 
reclamation requirements for open-pit mines in California, the Quechan Indian Nation, a 
federally recognized American Indian tribe successfully petitioned the tribunal to 
submit an amicus brief. The tribunal accepted amicus briefs from the Quechan Indian 
Nation, which made submissions regarding the government‟s alleged duty under 
international law to preserve sacred lands on which the mines were located.
225
 
Following the tribunal‟s decision to accept submissions from Quechan Nation, the NGO 
Friends of the Earth and the National Mining Associations also successfully petitioned 
the tribunal to submit amicus briefs.
226
 
Also apparent is the increased willingness of individual amici curiae to request 
intervention in multiple investor-State arbitrations.
227
 In Apotex Holdings Inc. and 
Apotex Inc. v. United States of America,
228
 Mr Barry Appleton sought participation 
rights as a non-disputing party. The petitioner argued that he could provide expertise 
and knowledge not provided by the disputing parties with respect to the consequences 
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of conduct that can distort international trade and investment flows and undermine 
market access benefits.
229
 The tribunal, however, stated that it had no doubt that the 
petitioner has the experience and expertise in investment treaty obligations and the 
analysis of governments‟ regulatory conduct, but did not consider that the perspective 
and insight of the petitioner would be any different from that of the counsel to the 
disputing parties.
230
 
Furthermore, in the case of AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza 
Erömü Kft. v. Hungary,
231
 a case brought against the Republic of Hungary by investors 
pursuant to the effects of new regulations introduced in order to comply with the EU 
competition law, the European Commission (a supranational organization) sought to 
submit amicus curiae briefs and succeeded.
232
 The European Commission made an 
application to file amicus curiae brief in order to secure and enforce EU competition 
law and influence the arbitral tribunal‟s decision on the merits.233 This third/non-
disputing party participation is a striking example of amicus curiae representing a direct 
legal interest in the outcome of a dispute as opposed to defending public interest.
234
 
Also in Eureko v. Slovak Republic,
235
 the tribunal itself requested amici curiae 
submissions from two entities. The first entity was the EU Commission, on the basis 
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that its views would assist the tribunal in a context where the claimant was invoking 
protections under a BIT concluded by two EU Member States.
236
 The second entity was 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, from which the tribunal sought input on certain issues 
of interpretation, given that it was the other State party to the BIT invoked by the 
claimant.
237
 In doing so, the tribunal became not only the first investor-State tribunal to 
request amici curiae submission on its own initiative, but also the first to receive such a 
submission from a State.
238
 
From this survey, one may conclude that amicus curiae participation (in other 
words, third/non-disputing party intervention) is not limited to public interest advocacy 
groups, as various types of legal entities may be admitted as amicus curiae. The ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do not create any 
requirements or limitations as to the nature of the entity or individual that can apply for 
amicus curiae.
239
  
However, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provides as one of the criteria 
for making an amicus curiae submission, a concise written statement containing the 
general description of the third party, disclosure as to any connection with a disputing 
party, and comprehensive information on any financial or other assistance in preparing 
the submission.
240
 
Ultimately, the requirement as to who can take part in investor-State arbitration 
as a third/non-disputing party refer rather to the valuable contribution a given entity or 
individual is able to add to the arbitration proceedings, its neutrality and independence 
from the disputing parties.
241
  
(b)  Written Submissions by Amicus Curiae 
Third/non-disputing party intervention in investor-State arbitration is primarily by 
amicus curiae submissions. The process of amicus curiae submission is generally 
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divided into two stages; an application to the tribunal for leave to file a brief under the 
conditions described above; and the actual submission, if the tribunal has granted the 
non-disputing party‟s application.242  
The criteria to be applied when considering the participation of amicus curiae are 
generally provided under the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the new UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency.
243
 Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules sets out the test the 
arbitral tribunal is to apply in exercising its discretion to accept or otherwise any 
particular application for amicus curiae submission. Rule 37(2) reads: 
„(2) After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a 
person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule 
called the “non-disputing party”) to file a written submission 
with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the 
dispute. In determining whether to allow such a filing, the 
Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to 
which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the 
Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related 
to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular 
knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing 
parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address matter 
within the scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the 
proceeding. 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party 
submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or 
unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given 
an opportunity to present their observations on the non-
disputing party submission.‟ 
The first condition concentrates on the non-disputing party‟s position to provide 
assistance to the tribunal. The tribunal will examine whether an applying amicus curiae 
has the expertise, experience and independence to provide valuable and relevant input to 
the case.
244
 The amicus curiae has to be both sufficiently knowledgeable on the issues 
within the scope of the dispute and possess the resources necessary to be able to present 
its submissions to the tribunal.
245
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The second condition, which requires the amicus curiae to make submissions 
within the scope of the dispute, seeks to ensure that arbitration proceedings focus on the 
settlement of dispute between the disputing parties. This standard has been held to be 
satisfied by arbitral tribunal through a declaration by the applying amicus curiae that it 
will address a matter within the scope of the dispute.
246
 
The third condition presupposes the requirement of a significant public interest, 
although the wording suggests a wider interpretation.
247
 Virtually all investor-State 
arbitrations contain some element of public interest, since such an arbitration relates to 
the responsibility of a sovereign State and often involves claims for significant 
compensation, which ultimately will be paid by tax payers.
248
  
However, it follows that such a public interest flowing from the involvement of 
a State and use of public funds would normally not be sufficient to allow amicus curiae 
submission. Such public interest exists where the decision of the arbitral tribunal would 
have an impact on a large group of people, society as whole, or raises important 
concerns of public international law and human right.
249
 The basic factors a tribunal 
often considers in this regard are, whether there exists a public interest or as seen in 
recent development, a legal interest,
250
 which plays an important role in a given dispute, 
and whether the amicus curiae seeks to justify that interest by its participation in the 
dispute.
251
 
Furthermore, when considering whether to allow an amicus curiae submission, 
an arbitral tribunal has to take into account the interests of the disputing parties and the 
procedural efficacy of the arbitration proceedings itself.
252
 The arbitral tribunal 
sometimes establishes requirements or guidelines for the non-disputing party‟s 
submission after agreeing to the application. Procedural safeguards are also put in place 
                                                          
246
 Ibid at 214. The second criterion defined in 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules should rather be seen 
as a requirement for amici submissions, and not a condition for admitting the non-disputing parties‟ 
applications. See also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. The United Republic of Tanzania supra note 
207 at para 50 wherein the tribunal was satisfied with a declaration. 
247
 Ibid. 
248
 Ibid. 
249
 See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America supra note 126; United Parcel Service of America v. 
Canada supra note 130; Suez et al v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 supra note 161; and 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. The United Republic of Tanzania supra note 205. 
250
 See AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Hungary supra note 231; Electrabel 
SA v. Republic of Hungary supra note 232; and Eureko v. Slovak Republic supra note 235. 
251
 Zachariasiewicz op cit note 7 at 214. 
252
 Ibid. 
44 
 
by tribunals in order to preserve the integrity of the proceedings.
253
 Similarly, disputing 
parties are usually allowed to provide observations on the non-disputing parties‟ 
applications and submissions.
254
  
Unlike the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
differentiate between submissions made by third persons and those made by a non-
disputing party to the treaty, and basically expand on the criteria provided under the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules.
255
  The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency leave the 
modalities and criteria for amicus curiae submission to the discretion of the arbitral 
tribunal, and lay down more detailed provision setting out specific requirements to be 
met by the third person and the form of the amicus curiae submission itself.
256
  
(c)  Participation in Oral Hearings 
Participation of third/non-disputing parties at the oral hearings held during arbitration 
proceedings generally depends on the consent of the parties.
257
 The provisions of the 
Arbitration Rules as regards the participation of other persons besides the parties and 
their legal representatives establish the privacy of oral hearings of the arbitration.
258
 It 
has been held by arbitral tribunals that Article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (old Article 25(4) of the Rules) as well as Article 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules were intended to exclude members of the public from the hearings, including 
third/non-disputing parties seeking participation in the arbitration proceedings.
259
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These provisions can only be overridden if there is consent from both parties for 
the participation of amicus curiae in the oral proceedings.
260
 Non-disputing parties were 
allowed to participate in the oral phase of the arbitration proceedings through consent of 
both parties in the Methanex and UPS v. Canada cases at the later stage of the 
proceedings, but not at the moment the amicus curiae petition was considered. Parts of 
the hearings were closed to the public for the reasons of commercial confidentiality.
261
 
However, oral hearings are generally open to the public under the new 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency subject to the protection of confidential 
information and the integrity of the arbitral process.
262
 The public access to hearings 
under the Rules applies to substantive hearings for the presentation of evidence and oral 
arguments rather than hearings dealing with procedural matters only.
263
 Public hearings 
in this regard can be described as a fundamental feature of transparency and essential to 
the enhancement of awareness and public confidence in investor-State arbitration, but 
do not grant a procedural right to a third/non-disputing party to make oral submissions 
directly in relation to the dispute between disputing parties. Participation of amicus 
curiae in hearings is particularly important in certain instances where further 
explanation on written submission is imminent.
264
 
(d) Access to Documents 
The issue of third/non-disputing parties having access to the documents in arbitration 
proceedings is not covered by the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.
265
   Arbitral tribunals in investor-State arbitration (under ICSID and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) have considered this issue in several cases and mostly 
disallowed access to documents in arbitration proceedings where amicus curiae 
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submissions were accepted.
266
 These arbitral tribunals‟ decisions emphasized that the 
third/non-disputing party‟s submission is to address broad policy issues in which the 
amici are specialized and to that effect, they do not need to obtain access to the record 
and documents of arbitration.
267
  
However, the tribunal in Piero Foresti case asked the parties to provide the amici 
curiae with redacted versions of documents filed in the arbitration.
268
 The tribunal 
stated that its decision in this regard was to focus their submissions on the issue arising 
in the case and to show them what position the parties had taken on those issues.
269
 The 
tribunal‟s decision was motivated by two basic principles:  
„(1) Non-disputing party participation is intended to enable 
non-disputing parties to give useful information and 
accompanying submissions to the Tribunal, but is not intended 
to be a mechanism for enabling non-disputing parties to obtain 
information from the Parties; and  
(2) Where there is non-disputing party participation, the 
Tribunal must ensure that it is both effective and compatible 
with the rights of the Parties and the fairness and efficiency of 
the arbitral process.‟270 
The competence to decide on the question of access by amici curiae to the 
documents submitted in the arbitration, particularly without the need to obtain the 
consent of the parties to the dispute, is generally at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, 
which must be exercised in accordance with the tribunal‟s general procedural powers 
under the governing Arbitration Rules.
271
  The decision of the tribunal is not subject to 
the consent of the parties, unless there already exists a confidentiality order made earlier 
in the proceedings, which would provide such a requirement.
272
 
On the other hand, the new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency set out a clear 
and comprehensive regime for submissions by third persons and access to documents in 
the arbitration proceedings.
273
 A determination by the arbitral tribunal as to whether to 
grant rights of access to documents to a third/non-disputing party is generally not 
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applicable, as documents in the arbitration proceedings are made available to the 
public.
274
  
Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency reflects a hierarchy of 
publication of documents. The following documents: „notice of arbitration and the 
response to the notice, the statements of claim, statement of defence and any further 
written statements or written submissions by any disputing party, a table listing all 
exhibits to all the aforementioned documents and to expert reports and witness 
statements (but not the exhibits themselves), any written submissions by non-disputing 
treaty Parties and by third parties, transcripts of hearings where available, and orders, 
decisions and awards‟ of the arbitral tribunal are made available to the public, subject to 
the provisions on confidentiality, without the need for a request to be made or discretion 
to be exercised.
275
  
Secondly, expert reports and witness statements, exclusive of their exhibits, are 
made available to the public upon request of any person to the arbitral tribunal, 
therefore reflecting the need for the arbitral tribunal to exercise its discretion.
276
 
Lastly, exhibits and documents not captured by article 3(1) and (2) can be made 
available to the public either by the arbitral tribunal on its own initiative or, upon 
request by any member of the public, and after consultation with the disputing parties, 
at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
277
 The Rules create a new legal regime for 
amicus curiae intervention as third/non-disputing parties accordingly have access to 
documents in arbitration proceedings subject to the protection of confidential and 
protected information.
278
  
VI  CONCLUSION 
Third party participation through the admission of amicus curiae briefs in investor-State 
arbitration emanated from the initiative taken by arbitral tribunals in the exercise of the 
broad procedural discretion granted by the applicable arbitration rules.
279
 Significant 
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efforts have been made in investor-State arbitration to address public concerns by the 
participation of third/non-disputing party in arbitral process. A review of the 
institutional and tribunals‟ approach to amicus curiae participation certainly highlights 
the promotion of third party participation in arbitral proceedings.
280
 
Nevertheless, concerns remain as to the preservation of confidential and 
protected information and privacy of arbitral proceedings on one hand and transparency 
and accountability on the other hand. The notion of third party (amicus curiae) 
participation challenges the basic assumption about the private and consensual 
foundations of the arbitration process.
281
 Third party participation is increasingly 
present in investor-State arbitration and the extent of its intervention has recently been 
expanded to include access to hearings and documents of arbitration, subject to the 
protection of protected and confidential information.
282
 As established above, the degree 
of privacy and confidentiality varies depending on the applicable arbitration rules 
agreed to by parties and/or designated in the investment treaty or contract.  
Both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation of United Nations Commission on 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have recently implemented reforms as regards the standards 
for third party participation in the settlement of investment dispute in their respective 
arbitration rules to facilitate greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations. These 
reforms directly impact on the degree of confidentiality and privacy of arbitration in 
investor-State arbitration. The next Chapter evaluates the extent to which the investor-
State arbitration regime recognizes disputing parties‟ rights to privacy and 
confidentiality under major institutional arbitration rules, conventions, and treaties.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
I  INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter analyses privacy and confidentiality under the various arbitral frameworks 
used most commonly in investor-State arbitration. The analysis considers the existing 
provisions on confidentiality in major institutional arbitration rules, treaties and 
investment agreements featuring recent revisions and developments incorporating legal 
standards of transparency.  
II  CONFIDENTIALITY IN ICSID ARBITRATION 
The Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States (ICSID Convention) was established in 1966 under the World Bank to resolve 
investment disputes between States and foreign investors.
283
 ICSID conduct arbitration 
under two set of rules: ICSID Arbitration Rules for disputes between parties to the 
ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules for disputes in which only either the 
State of the investor or the respondent State is a party to the ICSID Convention.
284
  
The ICSID Arbitration Rules are one of the procedural arbitration rules regularly 
used in investor-State Arbitration. In April 2006, ICSID implemented a series of 
significant changes to its Arbitration Rules.
285
 Unlike the old ICSID Rules, the recent 
amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules incorporate greater transparency and public 
involvement in ICSID arbitration.
286
 The revised ICSID Arbitration Rules as well as the 
ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility Rules) contain a mixture of both confidentiality 
and transparency provisions.
287
 
The existence of ICSID arbitration and information on the institution, conduct 
and disposition of each case is made publicly available in the ICSID Annual Report and 
on the ICSID website.
288
 ICSID‟s revised Arbitration Rules allow for increased 
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participation in the arbitral procedures by persons other than the parties to the 
dispute.
289
 
The oral procedure was amended to expand the category of persons that can 
attend hearings subject to the consent of parties and the existence of appropriate 
measure to secure proprietary or privileged information.
290
 The revised ICSID Rules 
give more power to the tribunal to decide whether or not to open the proceedings to the 
public.
291
 
The revised ICSID Rules explicitly incorporate the practice of amicus curiae 
submission into arbitration procedure.
292
 The ICSID Rules were silent with respect to 
amicus curiae questions until the 2006 revisions, although the practice had already 
emerged for tribunals to accept amici curiae briefs.
293
 The amendments empower the 
arbitral tribunal to accept amicus submissions by third parties even if both parties 
object, provided that the disputing parties were consulted and that stipulated conditions 
as regards application for amicus submissions are met.
294
 
The arbitrators are under the duty to keep confidential the contents of the 
award.
295
 The ICSID Centre has a duty to promptly publish excerpts of the legal 
reasoning of the tribunal and will only publish the award as a whole if the parties 
consent.
296
 These publications are made in the ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law 
Journal and on the ICSID website. 
However, parties themselves are not obliged to keep the awards confidential 
under the wordings of the ICSID Rules.
297
 Some of the ICSID orders and awards are 
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published by parties unilaterally on non-ICSID websites dedicated to the subject of 
investment treaty arbitration.
298
  
Although the ICSID Convention and Rules contain specific duties on the Centre 
to maintain confidentiality, it is silent on whether parties have a duty to maintain 
confidentiality in arbitral proceedings.
299
 It is not clear from the ICSID Rules or 
Regulations whether parties are allowed to disclose any information or documents to the 
public during or after the arbitral proceedings.
300
  
ICSID tribunals have frequently held that there is no general obligation of 
confidentiality in ICSID arbitrations.
301
 The tribunal in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. 
United Republic of Tanzania held that „in the absence of any agreement between the 
parties, there is no provision in the ICSID Arbitration Rules imposing a general duty of 
confidentiality in ICSID arbitration‟.302  
The tribunal, however, highlighted the need to protect procedural integrity and 
prevent exacerbation of the dispute. The tribunal balanced the need for transparency in 
the proceedings against the need to protect the procedural integrity of the arbitration by 
evaluating the weight that should be accorded to procedural integrity and noted that just 
like there was no guarantee or general rule imposing confidentiality, there was also no 
general rule of transparency even though the revised ICSID Rules reflected a clear trend 
towards increasing transparency of process.
303
  
III  CONFIDENTIALITY IN UNCITRAL ARBITRATION 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1976 and revised in 2010, are the second most commonly used set of arbitration rules 
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for settlement of investment disputes.
304
 Arbitration under these Rules is by far the most 
commonly selected ad hoc arbitral system.
305
  
The revised UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 expressly provide for the 
privacy of oral hearings
306
 and confidentiality of award. Hearings are held in camera 
unless the parties agree otherwise. In that capacity, investor-State arbitration hearings 
under the UNCITRAL Rules were opened to the public after the disputing parties had 
consented.
307
  
An award may be made public not only upon the consent of the parties, but also 
„where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or 
pursue a legal right or in relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent 
authority‟.308  
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are silent on the issue of publication of 
documents of arbitration proceedings such as, the minutes of meetings, the pleadings of 
disputing parties, and the orders of the arbitral tribunal.
309
 The absence of provisions 
here could imply that the matter of their publication is to be decided by the parties or to 
be determined by the discretion of the tribunal in a particular case.
310
  
Furthermore, there is no express mechanism under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules for third-party submissions, although it has been held that the broad discretion 
bestowed on arbitral tribunals to conduct proceedings as it considers appropriate under 
Article 17 encompasses the power to admit amicus curiae briefs.
311
  
IV  COMPARISON OF CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER ICSID AND UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES  
ICSID arbitration is, generally more transparent than UNCITRAL arbitration. Disputes 
before ICSID tribunals by their nature often involve issues of public interest which were 
traditionally not envisaged by the drafters of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as they 
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have their origin in commercial arbitration.
312
 The ICSID Rule on non-disputing party 
submissions demonstrates a level of transparency not currently found in the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
313
 
The UNCITRAL Rules are characterized by a higher level of confidentiality 
than ICSID arbitrations, in which the arbitral process is administered and publications 
made by the ICSID Centre. The ad hoc nature of UNCITRAL arbitration means there 
may be no institution comparable to the ICSID Centre to support the arbitral process.
314
 
UNCITRAL Rules standing alone do not impose a general duty of confidentiality.
315
 
Any additional confidentiality protection beyond privacy of arbitral proceedings and 
confidentiality of award, vary depending on the applicable law or the agreement of 
parties.
316
  
As increasing numbers of investor-State disputes are arbitrated under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the issue of transparency as against confidentiality was 
given greater attention due to the public interest in such proceedings.
317
 The revision of 
the UNCITRAL Rules to provide for greater transparency in investor-State arbitration 
was therefore undertaken by UNCITRAL Working Group II, leading ultimately to the 
adoption of UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State 
Arbitration in December 2013.
318
 
V  UNCITRAL LEGAL STANDARD FOR TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
UNCITRAL deliberations on whether and how to tackle transparency in treaty-based 
arbitrations took place in the wake of the amendments to the ICSID Rules in 2006, 
                                                          
312
 Stephen Jagusch & Jeffrey Sullivan „A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of 
Divergence and Concern‟ in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Newcombe 
(eds) Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (2011) 93-4. 
313
 Ibid at 93. 
314
 Ibid at 94-5. The parties may appoint an arbitral institution such as the PCA to support an arbitration 
under the UNCITRAL Rules.  
315
 Jagusch & Sullivan op cit note 312 at 95. 
316
 Ibid. 
317
 Ibid. 
318
 The Working Group II first considered the issue of transparency in investor-State arbitration at its 41
st
 
session in September 2008 where it decided to consider the issue after the revision of the UNCITRAL 
Rules in the generic form leading to the discussion on the legal standard of transparency in 2010 and 
subsequent adoption in 2013. See UNCITRAL Working Group II document A/CN.9/712 op cit note 158; 
and General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/109 op cit note 216. 
54 
 
which had incorporated greater transparency and opportunity for public access to 
investment arbitration.
319
  
The UNCITRAL Rules on transparency came into force on 1 April 2014. The 
Rules apply to investor-State arbitration under a treaty referring to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and concluded after the coming into force of the rules on 
transparency, unless parties to the treaty by agreement expressly opted out of the 
application of the Rules on Transparency.
320
 The reference to the resolution of disputes 
under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in such treaties would import the application of 
the Rules on Transparency pursuant to the addition made to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules as adopted in 2013.
321
 
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency may apply to investor-State arbitration 
arising under treaties concluded before its coming into effect where parties to the 
arbitration or contracting parties to the relevant treaty agree explicitly to the application 
of the Rules.
322
 This approach was adopted to avoid the dynamic treaty interpretation in 
determining the application of the Rules on Transparency to existing treaties that 
explicitly referred to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules particularly those containing „as 
amended‟, „as revised‟, „as in force at the time a claim is submitted‟ or words with 
similar meaning and effect.
323
  
The Rules on Transparency could be used together with arbitration rules other 
than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or in ad hoc proceedings if parties to a treaty or 
dispute expressly agreed to incorporate the Rules on Transparency in to its arbitration 
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proceedings.
324
 This flows from the mandate of UNCITRAL to prepare a legal standard 
on transparency, which could be applied universally without limiting its application to 
arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
325
 In promoting a uniform standard for 
transparency in investor-State arbitration, the Commission prepared and adopted a 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in order that 
States can multilaterally agree to apply the Rules on Transparency to their existing 
treaties.
326
  
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency address the publication of arbitration 
documents, the standard for amicus curiae submission and mandatory open hearings.
327
 
The Rules on Transparency differentiate between amicus submission made by „third 
persons‟, who are neither parties to the dispute nor parties to the treaty under which the 
dispute is brought from „non-disputing party to the treaty‟ who are not part of the 
dispute, but are parties to the treaty within the scope of the dispute.
328
  
The Rules on Transparency creates a default rule for open oral hearings and 
publication of key arbitration documents including all decisions and awards.
329
 Unlike 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Rules on Transparency require a permanent 
implementation mechanism in the form of a neutral repository to make public 
information pursuant to the requirement of the Rules.
330
 
Striking a balance between the public interest in transparency and the interest of 
the parties in resolving their dispute fairly and efficiently is a critical component of the 
Rules on Transparency.
331
 The Rules explicitly provide that the arbitral tribunal shall 
always in the exercise of its discretion take into account both the public interest in 
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transparency and the disputing parties‟ interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their 
dispute.
332
 
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency made the legal standard of transparency 
the general rule with the protection of confidential information and integrity of the 
arbitral process as an exception. The Rules defined confidential or protected information 
as: 
„(a) Confidential business information; 
(b) Information that is protected against being made available 
to the public under the treaty; 
(c) Information that is protected against being made available 
to the public, in the case of the information of the respondent 
State, under the law of the respondent State, and in the case of 
other information, under any law or rules determined by the 
arbitral tribunal to be applicable to the disclosure of such 
information; or 
(d) Information the disclosure of which would impede law 
enforcement.‟333 
The Rules on Transparency take a flexible and simplified approach to the 
definition of confidential or protected information. The arbitral tribunal determines what 
is confidential or protected information after consultation with the parties and makes 
arrangement for the protection of such information from the public.
334
 A disputing 
party, non-disputing party to the treaty or third person could withdraw from the record 
of proceedings all or part of a voluntarily introduced document, which the arbitral 
tribunal held not to be in a redacted form or prevented from being made public.
335
  
Certain information shall equally not be made public where the integrity of the 
arbitral process may be jeopardized resulting in the intimidation of witnesses, legal 
representative of disputing parties and members of the tribunal or hinder the collection 
and production of evidence.
336
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The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provide a robust regime of 
transparency in investor-State arbitration while giving comfort to disputing parties that 
confidential and protected information will be adequately protected.
337
  
VI  CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
AGREEMENTS 
This past decade shows development and changes in procedural rules and bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) to facilitate public participation in investor-State arbitration 
proceedings.
338
 Dispute resolution clauses in recent BITs and investment agreements 
dealing with public participation typically provide for public access to arbitration 
documents, oral hearings and third party participation subject to the protection of 
confidential information.
339
  
The US Model BIT adopted in 2012
340
 contains in its section B provisions on 
transparency of arbitral proceedings. Article 29 stipulates the types of documents to be 
made available to the public, conduct of open hearings and the procedural mechanism 
for protecting confidential information.
341
 Identical provisions with peculiar variations 
are adopted in other recent international investment agreements.
342
 
Similarly, regional investment agreements particularly the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as Free Trade Agreement between United States, 
Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) make provisions for a 
transparency regime.
343
 Chapter Eleven of NAFTA sets forth standards for treatment by 
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each NAFTA State of investors from other NAFTA States, as well as a mechanism for 
arbitrating investment disputes under those standards.
344
  
The NAFTA mechanisms for investor-state arbitrations did not originally 
address the topics of confidentiality and transparency.
345
 However, NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven arbitration regime has over the years incorporated transparency as a critical part 
of investor-State arbitration involving State parties.
346
 These developments under 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration seemed to have stimulated other forums for 
investor-State arbitration to take steps towards transparency.
347
 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven favourably addresses the issue of public access to 
documents, third-party participation and open hearings.
348
 NAFTA Chapter Eleven 
contains details on access on non-disputing parties to procedural documents and 
awards.
349
 Significantly, a joint statement of the NAFTA parties interpreting Chapter 
Eleven provisions declared that „nothing in NAFTA imposes a general duty of 
confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and subject to 
the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the parties from 
providing public access to documents submitted to or issued by a Chapter Eleven 
tribunal‟.350 It further stated that: 
„NAFTA Parties agree to make available to the public in timely 
manner all documents submitted to or issued by the tribunal 
subject to the redaction of (a) confidential business 
information; (b) information which is privileged or otherwise 
protected from disclosure under the Party‟s domestic law; and 
(c) information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the 
relevant arbitral rules, as applied.‟351  
The Statement endorses public access to documents generated during investor-
State arbitration under NAFTA. Arbitral hearings are equally open to the public (via 
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closed circuit television and online webcasting) unless there is need for the protection of 
confidential information.
352
 
The practice of allowing non-disputing parties to file written submissions gained 
substantial ground in NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitrations.
353
 The NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission issued a Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party 
Participation in 2003,
354
 noting that a tribunal has the discretion to determine the 
participation of a non-disputing party as amicus curiae upon consideration of a number 
of factors designed to help determine whether or not the amicus submission will be 
helpful to the tribunal. The Statement contains detailed guidelines for evaluating amicus 
curiae petitions and non-disputing parties only have access to publicly available 
documents while preparing its submission.
355
  
Accordingly, it would appear that despite the trend towards transparency of 
arbitration proceedings in recent investment treaties and agreements, disclosure of 
confidential information is protected and various measures for this protection depend on 
the provisions under the investment treaty/agreement and the applicable arbitration 
rules. 
VII  THE VALUES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
Confidentiality and transparency are both important and competing values in investor-
State arbitration, and the degree of application of each value depends on differing 
factors.
356
  
The crucial difference between transparency and confidentiality centres on the 
nature of the interests protected. A regime of confidentiality of investor-State arbitration 
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gives priority to the specific interests of the disputing parties, while a regime of 
transparency of investor-State arbitration give priority to the broader interests of the 
several stakeholders in international investment law and arbitration.
357
 This is inherent 
in the very notion of the two concepts based on accessibility to a limited number of 
authorized persons against public access.
358
  
(a)  Argument for confidentiality 
Confidentiality reinforces the notion of party autonomy, whereby parties are ideally 
given a choice of the applicable law and rules to govern their relationship.
359
 It is 
traditionally up to the parties to determine the parameters of the arbitration proceedings, 
which is reflected by the arbitration agreement and rules.
360
  
Confidentiality obviously reduces the possibility of external influences on 
arbitral proceedings and allows for effective resolution of the dispute between parties.
361
 
Confidentiality is necessary to preserve the pure dispute settlement nature of investment 
arbitration. Public participation may have a negative effect on the proceedings such as 
escalating the dispute between the parties or imposing on the arbitral tribunal the 
obligation to establish a coherent body of law, instead of simply resolving the dispute at 
hand.
362
 
Privacy of arbitral proceedings also safeguard the integrity of the disputing 
parties by preventing the exposure of related matters to arbitral proceeding to the wider 
public. It protects the parties‟ public image and may contribute to a reduction of tension 
between the parties.
363
 The confidential nature of arbitral proceedings averts alarming 
other foreign investors, who may be thinking of investing in the host State, as well as 
current or potential shareholders in the company instituting the arbitration.
364
  
Privacy of arbitral proceedings also reduces direct and indirect external 
influences on the proceedings, which increases flexibility in parties‟ arbitration 
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strategies including greater potential for amicable resolution.
365
 Similarly, 
confidentiality contributes to the de-politicization of investment disputes, which may 
facilitate moves towards negotiated settlement in view of a long term relationship 
between an investor and a host State.
366
 
In addition, confidentiality of arbitral proceedings protects proprietary 
information such as trademarks, patents, investment strategies, sensitive business 
information that could harm future business as well as government sensitive 
information.
367
  
(b)  Arguments for transparency  
The increasing level of recognition of the importance of good governance and 
accountability has brought about more insistent calls for transparency in investor-State 
arbitration.
368
 Transparency in investor-State arbitration has received significant traction 
over recent years as evidenced by the application of transparency standards by arbitral 
institutions, arbitration rules and investment treaty/agreements.
369
  
Transparency of arbitral decisions leads to the development and consistency in 
international law on foreign investment.
370
 It improves the clarity, certainty and 
predictability of investment law. The quality of decisions is increased and case-law 
becomes more consistent as tribunals and parties build on the experience and wisdom of 
past decisions.
371
 This in turn, increases participation and confidence in the system as it 
increases compliance with investment law, the establishment of generally accepted rules 
which will contribute to the avoidance of unnecessary dispute
372
 and increases pressure 
on parties to implement awards.
373
 
Potential disputing parties may benefit from transparency of arbitral process and 
awards by referring to arguments of parties and the conclusions of arbitral tribunals in 
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previous arbitrations when making their case.
374
 They might find support for their own 
case in earlier cases brought under comparable circumstances.
375
 Similarly, 
transparency fosters scholarly debate on particular controversial issues in the findings of 
arbitral tribunals, which in turn might be considered by arbitral tribunals in their 
decisions in subsequent cases.
376
 
Transparency in investor-State arbitration promotes good governance as it 
allows the broader public to observe and evaluate the conduct of the host State with 
regard to the exercise of its public functions. This applies equally to the conduct of the 
investor as its corporate governance is subject to increasing scrutiny.
377
  
One commentator has argued that while it is reasonable for investors to expect a 
transparent decision-making process in host countries, it is equally reasonable for the 
public to expect that disputes arising out of this process will be resolved in an equally 
open and transparent fashion.
378
  
Proponents of transparency in investor-State arbitration argue that transparency 
promotes consistency, furthers democratic principles, decreases party uncertainty and 
increases external legitimacy. 
VII  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the degree of transparency in the investor-State arbitration regime, it 
should be noted that both private investors and governments have important reasons to 
oppose unfettered public access.
379
 Investors may fear the disclosure of confidential 
business information, while governments are often reluctant to expose to public view 
the extent to which narrow interest groups have captured administrative and regulatory 
structures, fearful of gaining an exaggerated reputation as a poor host for foreign 
investment.
380
 
Confidentiality emphasizes the pure dispute settlement nature of investor-State 
arbitration, the aim simply being that of resolving dispute between two parties. 
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However, at the normative level, there seems to be a growing consensus on the need to 
favour transparency over confidentiality in arbitration proceedings which is principally 
premised on the public nature of the subject matter in investor-State arbitration.
381
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CHAPTER FIVE 
I  SUMMARY 
This paper establishes that privacy and confidentiality are of a peculiar character in 
investor-State arbitration, and differ considerably from the standards under traditional 
commercial arbitration. The principles of privacy and confidentiality are a major 
component of commercial arbitration, subject to certain exceptions (one of which is the 
public interest exception).  
In general, applicable arbitration rules in investor-State arbitration and the 
consent-based nature of arbitration provide disputing parties with the ability to fashion 
arbitral proceedings to preserve a degree of privacy and confidentiality. It is, however, 
established above that transparency of arbitration proceedings and the disclosure of 
information are subject to the overriding interest of the public and the legal and 
regulatory requirement of disclosure. 
The concurrent relationship between the investor and the State on one hand, and 
the public interest on the other hand is the core basis for the different approach to 
confidentiality in the framework of investor-State arbitration. The presence of these dual 
interests arises from the presence of public interest in almost every case, since a 
common element of investment dispute settlement is the liability of the State for 
breaches of a public international law undertaking.
382
 
The move towards transparency in investment arbitration was driven by 
demands from individuals and interest groups for participation in arbitral proceedings. 
The approach of arbitral tribunals and the institutional reactions in this regard have now 
embedded the participation of non-disputing parties as amicus curiae in investment 
arbitration.  
Public participation is increasingly present in investor-State arbitration as it 
develops, and the extent of public access has recently been expanded to include access 
to oral hearings and procedural documents and awards, subject to the protection of 
confidential and protected information. Concerns remain as to the preservation of 
confidential information in arbitral proceedings, and the parameters of protected 
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information are left largely to the parties to agree and for the tribunal to make 
appropriate procedural arrangements for its protection. 
The existing arbitration framework shows the recognition of transparency in 
different legal texts, such as the dispute settlement provision contained in recent BITs 
and investment agreement, designated arbitration rules and arbitral tribunals‟ 
decisions.
383
 Indeed the call for greater transparency in investor-State arbitration 
prompted the revision of institutional arbitration rules to incorporate the standards of 
transparency. A significant development is the revision of the ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and the adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in treaty-
based investor-State Arbitration.  
The ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which govern the vast majority 
of investment arbitration, provide for varying level of transparency and confidentiality 
as outlined above. On the other hand, the new 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
are currently the most comprehensive set of procedural rules governing transparency in 
treaty-bases investor-State arbitration.
384
 
The field of investment arbitration is evolving and the current investment 
dispute settlement framework reflects that evolution.
385
 The adoption of the 
Transparency Rules and other similar provisions constitute an important change in 
international arbitration practice and reflects an attempt to balance the conflicting 
interests of disclosing essential information and protecting confidential information. 
II  RECOMMENDATION 
Rules and principles governing public participation and procedural transparency in 
investment arbitration have developed over the years and have to some extent been 
codified in recent Rules revision. Nevertheless, concerns remain as to the proper 
balance between the competing interest in preserving confidentiality while ensuring 
transparency and accountability in investor-State arbitration. 
In order to achieve greater coherence in the approach taken to reconcile these 
competing interests, a uniform practice as regards confidentiality and transparency in 
investment dispute resolution framework is recommended. There is need for guidance 
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on the degree of intervention by an arbitral tribunal in the arbitration process as regard 
public access and the exercise of party autonomy and the extent of the tribunal‟s 
discretion to disclose certain information to the public or retain confidentiality. 
Enhanced transparency might erode party autonomy and flexibility in 
investment arbitration.
386
 In addition, transparency of proceedings might increase the 
cost of arbitration, extend the lifespan of arbitration proceedings and result in a decrease 
in the confidentiality of business information and State secrets. While these limitations 
can be compensated by logistical arrangements during arbitration proceedings, the 
effect on party autonomy deserves special consideration, as it touches upon the intrinsic 
value of investor-State arbitration.
387
 
It seems advisable to take a balanced approach according to which the degree of 
confidentiality and transparency is adapted to the different stages of the arbitral process. 
Proceedings should be shaped in accordance with the particular needs and interests in 
each procedural phase.  The new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration have adopted a balanced approach in this regard.  
Since ICSID arbitration is a self-contained system which governs the majority of 
investment arbitration, ICSID could consider a comprehensive amendment of its 
Arbitration Rules particularly in relation to public access to oral hearings and procedural 
documents, orders and awards. This amendment could incorporate and expand on the 
standard under the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, particularly on publication of 
procedural documents, the procedure of differentiating between the types of documents 
and the mechanism for its accessibility, general public access to oral hearings and a 
procedural regime for submissions made by non-disputing party to the treaty. 
Furthermore, a review of the provision on submissions by non-disputing party 
under the ICSID Rules is recommended. There may be a risk of conflict of interest on 
the part of non-disputing parties seeking to submit amicus curiae briefs in the case of an 
existing relationship with any of the disputing parties. Even though arbitral tribunals 
have in practice limited such submissions, it is suggested that an explicit provision be 
made in the arbitration rules. The review should consider the description of a 
prospective non-disputing party, its connection with the disputing parties as well as 
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members of the arbitral tribunal and the source of its financial or other assistance in 
making a submission.  
A further possible review consideration is the creation of a protocol as regards 
the form and timelines for the submission of amicus curiae briefs. This will mitigate the 
drawback that transparency increases costs and creates delay in arbitral proceedings.  
 
There is no clear definition of confidential and protected information under 
either the ICSID or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. However, setting out a regime 
enumerating confidential or protected information may be detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the legal framework of investment arbitration. It is therefore suggested 
that ICSID Arbitration Rules provide for a general definition of confidential information 
and the mechanism for its protection. A regime guiding the scope of the duty to 
maintain confidentiality of protected and confidential information after the conclusion 
of arbitration should also be considered.
 
It is important to note that the comprehensive transparency regime under the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency will not be adequately utilised without its uniform 
application to arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules pursuant to a treaty concluded before 
its coming into force and perhaps in arbitration under other arbitration rules. Therefore, 
in my view State parties to existing investment treaties should become contracting 
parties to the recently adopted United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration in order to promote a uniform standard. Subject to the 
agreement of the parties, arbitral tribunals should also adopt the use of the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency where arbitration rules other than UNCITRAL and ICSID 
Arbitration Rules apply. 
In addition, existing investment treaties and agreements could be reviewed to 
provide a comprehensive provision on a balanced approach to confidentiality and 
transparency in dispute settlement procedure. 
The challenge of the current legal framework in investor-State arbitration relates 
to the particular nature of investment arbitration and the reconciliation of the 
fundamental characteristics of arbitral process with legitimacy and accountability 
flowing from public nature of the subject matter of dispute.  Transparency should be 
upheld in moderation while confidentiality should not be completely disregarded in 
order to ensure the integrity, viability and neutrality of investor-State arbitration. 
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III  CONCLUSION 
The recent trend in investor-State arbitration has taken a more nuanced approach to 
confidentiality and allowed a greater degree of transparency in arbitral proceedings. The 
question of how to balance the demands for transparency against the need for 
confidentiality touches on a core aspect of arbitral proceedings.
388
 Demands for 
transparency have to respect procedural integrity and the interest of the disputing parties 
that certain information remained confidential.
389
 
The need to protect business or governmental secrets seems to be largely 
acknowledged, as is the need to protect the integrity of arbitral proceedings from any 
external pressure on the parties or on the arbitral tribunals. Confidentiality may at least 
ultimately contribute to the efficiency of investment arbitration as a dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
The concern for legitimacy and accountability has led to the erosion of the 
principle of confidentiality in arbitral proceedings and the ground has certainly shifted 
towards greater transparency in investor-State arbitration. Confidentiality in investor-
State arbitration has evolved from protecting the existence of the arbitration 
proceedings, privacy of oral hearings, confidentiality of procedural documents and 
awards to the current practice of simply protecting confidential information and the 
integrity of arbitral proceedings. In this context, this paper recommends the 
establishment of consistent guidelines within all frameworks for investor-State 
arbitration for the participation of third/non-disputing parties and the protection of 
confidential information. 
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